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DIRECT EFFECT JURISDICTION UNDER THE 
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT: 
SEARCHING FOR AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 
JOHN C. BALZANO* 
Recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court as to the 
international reach of American antitrust and securities statutes have 
engendered significant debate about the appropriate extraterritorial 
application of federal law.  Such debates have also slowly come to include 
some mention of the right application of state law beyond U.S. boundaries 
through long-arm statutes.  The arguments of different commentators and 
jurists universally support careful consideration of the implications of 
prescribing a rule of U.S. law to foreign conduct, absent an appropriate 
basis in international law and practice.  The time is now right, therefore, to 
consider how these debates affect a statute that combines federal and state 
law and potentially prescribes both of those sources of law abroad in the 
same action: The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). 
This Article discusses the “direct effect” provision under FSIA’s 
commercial activities exception.  It argues that the jurisprudence 
interpreting the appropriate reach of that provision has become confusing 
and unworkable, and advocates a reinterpretation in light of the ongoing 
larger discussion about extraterritoriality in the federal and state law 
contexts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The extraterritorial application of U.S. law and regulation to conduct 
in another nation is neither a new1 nor a simple matter.2  The regulatory 
state and its influence over sensitive matters, such as personal finance, food 
and drugs, and Internet communications, coupled with the continued 
transnationalization of business and human relations, mean that countries 
must always be concerned with what goes on abroad and how it will affect 
the state and society in the United States.3  Where and according to what 
law we will hold accountable those across sovereign boundaries who 
poison our food,4 crash and spy on our computers,5 steal our hard-earned 
 
 1.  See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355–57 (1909) (setting forth the 
circumstances in which the law of one sovereign may reach beyond its own borders). 
 2.  Zachary D. Clopton, Extraterritorality and Extranationality: A Comparative Study, 23 DUKE 
J. COMP. & INT’L L. 217 (similarly defining extraterritoriality and noting how the increase in 
transnational interactions makes it of greater importance). 
 3.  See, e.g., Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 640 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that 
the situs of injury of copyright infringement is satisfied where infringement occurred via the Internet 
and was available to anyone in New York state with an Internet connection, despite the lack of any 
evidence that the work in question was downloaded). 
 4.  See, e.g., INST. OF MEDICINE, REPORT BRIEF: ENSURING SAFE FOODS AND MEDICAL 
PRODUCTS THROUGH STRONGER REGULATORY SYSTEMS ABROAD (2012) (discussing emerging global 
standards and practices on food safety), available at http://www.iom.edu/~/media/ 
Files/Report%20Files/2012/Ensuring-Safe-Foods-and-Medical-Products-Through-Stronger-Regulatory-
Systems-Abroad/safefoodmeds_rb.pdf; see also Stephanie Glynn, Note, Toxic Toys and Dangerous 
Drywall: Holding Foreign Manufacturers Liable for Defective Products – the Fund Concept, 26 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 317, 318 (2012) (“[B]ecause the current legal system makes it virtually 
impossible for U.S. plaintiffs to sue Chinese manufacturers, legal redress is limited or nonexistent for 
the majority of these consumers.  Three primary procedural hurdles—personal jurisdiction, service of 
process, and enforcement of the judgment—prevent suits against Chinese manufacturers.”). 
 5.  See, e.g., MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, 702 F.3d 725, 729–31 (2d Cir. 2012) (exercising 
personal jurisdiction over a Canadian resident for accessing a server in Connecticut); CYBERsitter, 
LLC v. China, No. CV 10-38-JST (SHx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128345, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 
BALZANO MACRO CLEAN(DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2014  12:32 PM 
2013] DIRECT EFFECT JURISDICTION UNDER THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT 3 
savings,6 and even break our hearts7 are by no means insignificant 
questions.  Nor, for that matter, are they questions that our legal system is 
close to answering.  For these reasons, debates over the extraterritorial 
application of statutes and extension of court jurisdiction8 have been very 
significant over the last several years, particularly in the areas of federal 
employment law,9 antitrust,10 and securities statutes.11 
These federal statutes are not the only ones to engender such 
controversy.  The extraterritorial provision of the commercial activities 
exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA)12 has 
also led to hundreds of judicial opinions over the last thirty-six years and a 
great deal of confusion and debate.  Specifically, the provision (hereinafter 
the “direct effect provision”), which allows for jurisdiction and suit over a 
foreign sovereign or related entity when a commercial activity abroad 
 
2010) (“Plaintiff CYBERsitter, LLC d/b/a Solid Oak Software (‘Solid Oak’) filed suit against the 
People’s Republic of China (‘PRC’) et al. for misappropriation of trade secrets and copyright 
infringement for allegedly copying nearly 3,000 lines of code from Solid Oak’s software program 
‘CYBERsitter’ and disseminating it to tens of millions of end users in China.  Defendant Sony 
Corporation, joined by Defendants Acer, Inc., BenQ Corporation, and ASUSTeK Computer, 
Inc.  (‘Taiwanese Defendants’), moves to dismiss the action on the grounds of forum non conveniens 
because California is an inconvenient forum and the dispute should be heard in China.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 6.  See, e.g., Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811, 814 (6th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff was a 
victim of a scam run by individuals in Nigeria). 
 7.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Kimura, 471 N.W.2d 869, 871 (Iowa 1991) (adjudication of the 
dissolution of a marriage with only one party domiciled in U.S. forum). 
 8.  The lines between inquiring into prescriptive jurisdiction (whether a law-making body was 
within its authority to and did intend to prescribe conduct abroad), subject matter jurisdiction (whether a 
court has power over the substance of a particular suit), and personal and/or in rem jurisdiction (whether 
a court has power over the relevant persons and their property) are not well defined, particularly in 
terms of intrusion into the domain of another sovereign.  The questions of whether, for example, a court 
applies U.S. law to conduct that occurred in France and/or whether it exercises jurisdiction over French 
citizens and juristic persons, applying either U.S. or French law in a U.S. judicial forum governed by 
U.S. procedural rules, may both result in an intrusion into the territorial jurisdiction of another 
sovereign.  See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786–87 (2011) (“The Due 
Process Clause protects an individual’s right to be deprived of life, liberty or property only by the 
exercise of lawful power . . . .  This is no less true with respect to the power of a sovereign to resolve 
disputes through judicial process than with respect to the power of a sovereign to prescribe rules of 
conduct for those within its sphere.”)  This piece seeks to answer whether these extensions are justified 
in the FSIA context, and, in doing so, it also seeks to sharpen the lines between personal jurisdiction 
and prescriptive jurisdiction in the FSIA context. 
 9.  See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991), superseded by statute, 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 2 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) (discussing the extraterritorial reach of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964). 
 10.  See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
 11.  See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2879 (2010). 
 12.  Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
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causes “a direct effect in the United States,” has led courts to struggle with 
related larger issues, such as those of extraterritoriality, under both 
international and U.S. law and the procedural due process concerns of 
reaching beyond sovereign borders without the defendant having a relevant 
and reasonable connection to the forum in which the litigation is brought.13 
Federal Courts of Appeals have tried numerous methods to add 
meaning to the direct effect provision in FSIA, a provision which is 
textually rather bare-bones.  The potential breadth with which the direct 
effect provision could be read, given its sparse language, appears to trouble 
the courts, leading them to consider the territorial limits on other types of 
statutes.  Courts have tried to use analogs from jurisprudence interpreting 
state long-arm statutes, the minimum contacts due process analysis 
developed by the Supreme Court, the standards for extraterritorial effects 
jurisdiction under the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations (i.e., 
international law), and, more recently, a “legally significant act” test 
created for FSIA itself from the raw materials of the aforementioned 
doctrines.14  A review of approximately 500 cases that were litigated to 
opinion in the federal district and appellate courts concerning the direct 
effect provision, conducted by the author, shows that nearly all of these 
attempts have degenerated into a morass of confusion.  Some of the latest 
cases highlight just how difficult the legally significant act test is to 
apply.15 
Courts have repeatedly acknowledged how confusing the language in 
FSIA is on a number of fronts,16 but few have acknowledged just how 
complex a statute it is as well.  Take the direct effect provision, for 
example.  There, a court is seemingly asked to consider one question—
whether a relevant act abroad has a direct effect in the United States such 
that it is appropriate for a court to hear the case—in a context in which a 
court might typically consider several other weighty questions, such as 
whether it has subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the defendant 
and whether federal or state law should apply to the foreign conduct at 
issue.  Add to that another layer of complexity: the implications (foreign 
 
 13.  See infra Part III. 
 14.  See infra Part III (discussing analogies to those doctrines and the development of the legally 
significant act test). 
 15.  See infra Part III. 
 16.  See, e.g., Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) 
(describing FSIA as “a six-year-old statutory labyrinth that, owing to the numerous interpretive 
questions engendered by its bizarre structure and its many deliberately vague provisions, has during its 
brief lifetime been a financial boon for the private bar but a constant bane of the federal judiciary”). 
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policy or otherwise) of permitting such a suit against a foreign sovereign.17  
Refining that many serious questions into a superficial textual inquiry is not 
conducive to resolving that problem effectively. 
FSIA is a statute riddled with contradictions and conflicts.  On the 
surface it appears to rest on a simple premise and put a very simple task to 
the courts: treat a private-acting sovereign-connected entity just as any 
other private defendant entity.  Within the web of its provisions, however, 
FSIA tinkers endlessly with the procedural framework of the run-of-mill 
lawsuit that would exist between private entities under state or federal 
substantive law.  While the Statute strives to treat the foreign state on a 
plane of equality with private parties,18 it ultimately makes such unity 
impossible and therefore requires frustrating compromises regarding 
typical conceptions of official accountability and social justice.19 
The crux of the problem is as follows.  The Supreme Court has made 
congressional intent, analyzed through the lens of a presumption against 
extraterritoriality, the foundation of the analysis of the extraterritorial reach 
of a statute, but it has also employed a grab bag of considerations under the 
heading of “comity concerns” to permit judicial restraint.20  In the FSIA 
context, however, the Court’s decision in Republic of Argentina v. 
Weltover, Inc. prevents the operation of any of the nuance of this approach 
by focusing heavily on FSIA’s words in a brand of ardent textualism that 
has become more common in FSIA cases.21  But a simple textualist rule 
cannot solve the complex debate that preceded that rule over whether 
courts should analyze the direct effect provision in terms of Congressional 
 
 17.  See, e.g., Blackfeet Nat’l Bank v. Nelson, 171 F.3d 1237, 1244 n.10 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(describing FSIA as addressing an issue, foreign sovereign immunity, of “paramount national 
concern”); see also Stephens v. Nat’l Distillers Chem. Corp., 69 F.3d 1226, 1232–33 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(noting same); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 
1170, 1174–76 (2007) (discussing the cost-benefit analysis and separation of powers concerns that 
animate courts’ decisions to use various international comity-related doctrines to defer or decline to 
defer to foreign interests in litigation under U.S. statutes, one of which is FSIA, with an extraterritorial 
element). 
 18.  Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 613–15 (1992). 
 19.  One of the worst compromises into which Congress has forced litigants against foreign states 
is created by the fact that FSIA’s scope of immunity for suit and for execution and attachment are 
incongruent.  FSIA may provide jurisdiction for suit without providing the ability for a plaintiff to 
collect on its judgment.  See FG Hemisphere Assocs., LLC v. Dem. Rep. Congo, 637 F.3d 373, 377 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (noting that FSIA may provide a right without a remedy because “[t]he FSIA is a 
rather unusual statute that explicitly contemplates that a court may have jurisdiction over an action 
against a foreign state and yet be unable to enforce its judgment unless the foreign state holds certain 
kinds of property subject to execution.”). 
 20.  See infra Part II. 
 21.  See 504 U.S. at 611.  See also infra Part III (discussing Weltover and the implications of its 
holding); infra note 215 (discussing this textualism). 
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intent or principles circumscribing their power to adjudicate a case.22  This 
divergence from other extraterritoriality jurisprudence is particularly 
troubling because FSIA litigation raises the same fundamental issue that 
makes most types of “transnational litigation” unique: concern over the 
insults to sovereignty that may occur when litigation crosses national 
boundaries.  FSIA is doubly problematic in this regard because it 
potentially regulates foreign conduct through both a federal immunity 
standard and a state law standard embodied in a civil cause of action.  This 
Article argues that, in light of these complexities, a reinterpretation of FSIA 
by the Supreme Court is needed to classify its reach under the direct effect 
provision as a question of legislative or prescriptive jurisdiction,23 to bring 
it into line with the other extraterritoriality cases, and to clarify the nature 
and quality of the “effect in the United States” required.  Such a 
reinterpretation would include a turn away from unproductive textualism 
and move to a more informed exercise of statutory construction and 
consideration of implicit international comity concerns. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  In the first part, it discusses the 
relevant mechanics of FSIA.  In the second part, it briefly examines 
international practice, Supreme Court precedent, and the literature 
surrounding extraterritorial jurisdiction generally as well as the little 
literature that exists on FSIA’s direct effect provision.  This part begins to 
situate FSIA within the larger debate over how courts should analyze the 
extraterritorial reach of federal statutes.  The third part examines the long 
history of how the direct effect provision has been interpreted and handled 
by courts.  In this part, the Article argues that the legally significant act test, 
which the Second Circuit designed for the direct effect provision, is neither 
helpful nor supported by the language of FSIA and that, consequently, that 
test should be discarded in future cases.  The fourth part draws on the 
conclusions reached by courts and scholars to argue for the approach 
summarily described in the preceding paragraph. 
I. RELEVANT ASPECTS OF FSIA 
It is not necessary to repeat a broad and in-depth discussion of the 
history, purposes, and structure of FSIA.  For current purposes, only a few 
facts are necessary.  First, FSIA begins with a broad general rule that 
foreign states are immune from the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts unless 
one of a number of exceptions applies.24  I have previously argued that the 
 
 22.  See infra Part III. 
 23.  See supra note 8 (defining prescriptive jurisdiction). 
 24.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605–07 (2012).  There are nine exceptions under FSIA: waiver, 
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“jurisdiction” discussed in FSIA’s opening section is civil jurisdiction and 
that FSIA does not grant immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the 
courts.25 
FSIA creates original and valid federal subject matter and in personam 
jurisdiction in the district courts to hear these civil claims,26 and it provides 
for a right of removal for claims that are brought in state court.27  FSIA’s 
exceptions are meant to primarily encompass activities that are private and 
non-sovereign in nature, although a few of the activities that form the basis 
for the exceptions do not fit that description.28  The provision on which this 
Article focuses is embedded within the “commercial activities” exception.29  
Although the term “commercial” itself is not defined within the statute, a 
feature that has frustrated many judges,30 the term “commercial activity” is 
defined in FSIA as “a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular 
commercial transaction or act,”31 and the Statute also provides some 
guidance by demanding that the commercial character of the activity at 
issue be decided based not on the activity’s purpose but rather upon its 
nature.32 
FSIA then offers three different exclusive scenarios in which the 
commercial activities of a foreign state might be adjudicated by U.S. 
courts.33  In all cases the claim must be “based upon” the relevant activity 
abroad or in the United States.34  But, each scenario requires a nexus to the 
United States.  The first scenario involves the foreign state simply 
conducting commercial transactions in the United States.35  The second 
scenario involves the foreign state committing an act, not necessarily 
 
commercial activities, non-commercial torts in the United States, expropriation, arbitral award 
enforcement, counterclaims, terrorist activities, and rights in property gifts or other inherited property in 
the United States, and maritime lien enforcement. 
 25.  John Balzano, Crimes and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: New Perspectives on an 
Old Debate, 38 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 43 (2012). 
 26.  28 U.S.C. § 1330(a)–(b) (2012).  See also Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 
480, 488 (1983) (affirming FSIA’s constitutionality as a jurisdictional statute). 
 27.  28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (2012). 
 28.  Id. § 1605(a); John Balzano, A Hidden Compromise: Qualified Immunity in Suits Against 
Foreign Governmental Officials, 13 OR. REV. INT’L L. 71, 77 (2011) (noting that the terrorism 
exception and the expropriation exceptions to FSIA do not necessarily fit into the private activities 
paradigm). 
 29.  28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 
 30.  See infra Part III (discussing that frustration in the context of the Weltover case). 
 31.  28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2012). 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. § 1605(a)(2). 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
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commercial in nature, in the United States “in connection with” a 
commercial activity that it is carrying on outside U.S. borders.36  And 
finally, the provision with which this article is concerned allows for 
adjudication of acts abroad connected to commercial activity abroad if it 
has a “direct effect” in the United States.37  Specifically, the direct effect 
provision states that immunity is lifted if “the action is based . . . upon an 
act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a 
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a 
direct effect in the United States.”38  Because these provisions require that 
the commercial activity or related acts be the basis for the action and not 
that the action must sound in commercial law, they can apply to both 
contract and tort actions.39 
Although the FSIA rule on foreign sovereign immunity itself is a 
federal codification of international law,40 the contract or tort cause of 
action against the foreign state may be a question of state substantive law.  
The court may thus be applying state substantive law to foreign commercial 
conduct.  For this reason, courts struggling with the direct effect provision 
have analogized it to a long-arm statute.41  This analogy, as the discussion 
below will illustrate, has created confusion between courts over the 
distinction between prescribing behavior and exercising jurisdiction over 
people and assets. 
In addition, Congress included a statutory grant of personal 
jurisdiction in FSIA.  Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) grants personal 
jurisdiction over the foreign state defendant as long as that defendant was 
served in accordance with FSIA’s rules on service and one of the 
exceptions to immunity applies.42  This statutory structure, however, does 
not answer the question of whether the exercise of jurisdiction must comply 
with due process standards, particularly given the unique character and 
variation of defendants under FSIA.  Sometimes the defendant is the 
foreign state proper, and sometimes the defendant is an ordinary state-
owned enterprise.43  This structure has become relevant to the 
 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 39.  See, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993) (allegations of intentional torts under 
commercial activity exception); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (a non-commercial tort exception that 
covers any torts that are not covered in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)’s commercial activities exception). 
 40.  Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 497–98 (1983). 
 41.  See infra note 146. 
 42.  28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (2012). 
 43.  See, e.g., Shapiro v. Republic of Bol., 930 F.2d 1013, 1018–20 (2d Cir. 1991) (concluding 
that the FSIA requires that due process be satisfied but that the standard is different from that for 
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interpretations of the direct effect provision.44 
In interpreting FSIA, courts have used various tools, including the 
language of the statute, the legislative history, and the content of both 
international law and federal common law, both at the time of FSIA’s 
enactment and beyond.  They have also used analogies from cases 
concerning entirely domestic law issues.  It will become apparent during 
the discussion of the history of cases interpreting the direct effect provision 
in FSIA that this collection of interpretive techniques has led courts down a 
highly confusing and dynamic path without producing any sort of 
comprehensive solution.  This Article will show that it is perhaps this 
failure of courts to think about FSIA’s direct effect provision within the 
larger conceptual context of extraterritoriality debates that has led 
jurisprudence interpreting this provision down such an unproductive road. 
II. THE DEBATE OVER EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
A. General Principles under International Law 
As a principle of international law, the widely acknowledged 
“territoriality principle” provides that a state has plenary jurisdiction over 
activity that takes place within its national territory.45  But there are 
circumstances, some more accepted internationally than others, in which a 
state exercises regulatory powers over events, people, or things that are 
outside its borders.  One of the more accepted bases for such an extension 
is nationality, whether of natural persons or juridical (corporate) persons.  
There are important examples of this citizenship-based principle in certain 
provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, which hold U.S. corporations accountable for their behavior in other 
countries.46 
As a corollary to that principle, an action or transaction abroad that 
creates an “effect” within a jurisdiction is a basis for extraterritorial 
application, albeit at times still a controversial one.47  Debates about effects 
 
permitting subject matter jurisdiction: “[a]s noted, the ‘substantial contact’ standard for subject matter 
jurisdiction under the commercial activity exception of Section 1605(a)(2) requires a closer nexus than 
the ‘minimum contacts’ necessary for due process.”). 
 44.  See infra Part III. 
 45.  See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878) (“The authority of every tribunal is necessarily 
restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established.  Any attempt to exercise 
authority beyond those limits would be deemed in every other forum . . . an illegitimate assumption of 
power . . . .”); see also THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NATIONAL LAWS 35–36 (Dieter 
Lange & Gary Born eds., 1987). 
 46.  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012). 
 47.  EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION, supra note 45, at 36–37.  Another, more controversial, 
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jurisdiction have been prominent in the antitrust context.48  This basis is 
controversial because the effects-based jurisdiction threatens to drag 
entities into conflicts between standards for liability in different countries.49  
The direct effect provision incorporates into FSIA the controversial effects 
basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction under international law.  Yet, despite 
being controversial, effects-based jurisdiction under U.S. law seems to be 
more and more common.  It has been employed in antitrust, export control, 
import regulation, and securities regulation (until recently) contexts, and, 
perhaps most commonly, it has been employed through nearly all of the 
state long-arm statutes that, in conjunction with due process standards, can 
permit a state court to exercise jurisdiction and, if the conflicts analysis so 
indicates, to apply state law to out-of-state activity that causes an effect in 
the jurisdiction.50 
One “helpful”51 summary of the U.S. view of the nature and quality of 
the effect necessary to legitimize extraterritorial prescription has been 
developed in the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws52 and 
subsequently in the Restatements of the Law on Foreign Relations.  Some 
concepts of international balancing also find their way to a lesser extent 
into the Restatement (Second) on Conflict of Laws, which controls choice 
of law inquiries that can lead to the application of state law to foreign 
conduct.53  The Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations—in existence at 
 
basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction is the passive personality principle, in which a state asserts 
jurisdiction over conduct abroad because the victim of that conduct is one of its nationals.  E.g., 28 
U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(ii) (2012).  This basis has been invoked for victims of terrorist attacks.  Id. 
 48.  See infra Part II.B (discussing antitrust jurisprudence). 
 49.  See infra Section II.B. (discussing how the Supreme Court has tried to avoid conflicts with 
the laws of other nations as part of its adjudication of effects jurisdiction in antitrust cases). 
 50.  EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION, supra note 45, at 38–39. 
 51.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1673 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring).  
The restatements of law on foreign relations are not best described as the source of international law, 
although they are perhaps a good summary of U.S. views on the matter.  See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
California, 509 U.S. 764, 817–18 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (relying on the Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations to resolve issues of extraterrioriality); see also Lea Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial 
Application of American Law: A Methodological and Constitutional Appraisal, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 11, 12–13 (Summer 1987) (describing the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws to issues of extraterritorial application of laws).  It is also notable, because of the changes in the 
law that this Article will discuss, that the American Law Institute has begun work on the Restatement 
(Fourth) of Foreign Relations, which will, inter alia, consider issues of foreign sovereign immunity and 
extraterritoriality.  Current Projects: Restatement Fourth, The Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States, AM. LAW INST., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj_ip&projectid=28 (last 
visited Sept. 4, 2013). 
 52.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 65 (1934).  The restatement gave jurisdiction 
both to the state where the acts were committed and to the state where the consequences were felt.  Id. 
 53.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1969) (requiring courts to consider 
the needs of the international system when deciding which law to apply). 
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the time that Congress enacted FSIA—gives four conditions for 
extraterritorial prescription: (1) the conduct must be relevant to the cause of 
action, (2) the effect must be “substantial,” (3) the effect must be a 
foreseeable consequence of such conduct, and (4) the cause of action must 
not be “inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized by 
states that have reasonably developed legal systems.”54  Under the 
Restatement (Third), the relevant basis for prescriptive jurisdiction is 
conduct that is “intended to have or has a substantial effect” inside a given 
state’s territory,55 but that exercise of jurisdiction must also be assessed as 
“reasonable” by evaluating a list of factors that includes the substantiality, 
directness, and foreseeability of the effect; other relevant connections with 
the forum; and other considerations that are tantamount to a balancing of 
different states’ interests in regulating the conduct at issue.56 
B. The Debate in the Supreme Court 
In U.S. federal court jurisprudence, the primary debate over 
extraterritoriality has been about the reach of federal statutes.57  Congress 
has the power to regulate some conduct occurring abroad as part of its 
prescriptive jurisdiction.  Unlike the assertion of court jurisdiction over 
persons and things abroad,58 Congress’s prescriptive jurisdiction is 
seemingly not subject to any established constitutional limits,59 although 
some commentators believe that it should be constrained by due process.60  
 
 54.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 18 (1965). 
 55.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403 (1987). 
 56.  Id. § 404.  As one scholar notes about the Restatements of Foreign Relations: “[T]he 
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law seems to indicate that its dictates of international law are 
American in origin.”  Brilmayer, supra note 51, at 12.  Part IV, infra, will argue that the breadth of 
accepted international norms should perhaps not be based so narrowly on the Restatement. 
 57.  I do not claim, of course, that this debate begins and ends with the cases below.  They do, 
however, represent, a good cross-section of the Court’s jurisprudence and the concerns that have played 
into its analysis of the reach of such a statute. 
 58.  See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413 (1984) 
(holding that due process standards for personal jurisdiction apply to parties in foreign nations). 
 59.  See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 579 n.7 (1953) (noting that construing a statute as 
applying domestically is different from recognizing a limit on Congress’s power to legislate that far and 
treating the question of application of a statute as one of intent and not as one of limits).  Of course, in 
enacting statutes, Congress must act pursuant to an enumerated power.  In that respect, the direct effect 
provision of FSIA’s commercial activity exception stands in good stead because it is, as is FSIA itself 
in part, a clear exercise of Congressional power to regulate commerce with foreign nations.  See U.S. 
CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (authorizing Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”; see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (implying that Congress could punish conduct occurring solely abroad 
between foreign parties in violation of the law of nations provided that it is clear in this desire). 
 60.  See Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due 
Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1223 (1992) (“It is our thesis that the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
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In the absence of specific limits, whether Congress acts in an unruly 
fashion when prescribing foreign conduct or whether it generally exercises 
its powers in congruence with the principles of international law is 
debatable.61 The Supreme Court, however, has been willing to give 
Congress wide latitude in this respect.62 
In interpreting a statute to reach conduct abroad, the Supreme Court 
has used different interpretive tools separately or in combination, including 
a presumption against extraterritoriality, standard tools of statutory 
interpretation (text, history, and purposes), recognized principles of 
international law relating to extraterritorial jurisdiction, conflicts with 
foreign regulation, multiple regulation concerns, and additional comity 
concerns.  But apart from direct, irreconcilable conflicts, the Court has 
treated these inquiries more as methods of statutory interpretation than as 
conclusive rules or presumptions with precedential effect.  This may be, in 
part, because of the dynamic nature and trajectory of global transactions 
and commerce.  It may also be because circumstances have differed in such 
a way that the perceived dangers of foreign relations problems and the 
desire to preserve the international order63 have led the court to opt for a 
more flexible approach.64 
 
Clause limits federal actions in much the same manner that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause limits state actions.  Although no Supreme Court case explicitly discusses and adopts this 
proposition, little or no authority exists to the contrary.  When the Supreme Court finally does address 
this question, we believe the proper answer is clear: Fifth Amendment limits extraterritorial application 
of federal substantive law.”); see also United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Only 
two restrictions exist on giving extraterritorial effect to Congress’ directives.  We require Congress 
make clear its intent to give extraterritorial effect to its statutes.  And secondly, as a matter of 
constitutional law, we require that application of the statute to the acts in question not to violate the due 
process clause of the [F]ifth [A]mendment” (citations omitted)). 
 61.  See A.V. LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION: AN ANNOTATED COLLECTION OF LEGAL 
MATERIALS xv (1983) (“The United States of America is much the most prominent of the claimants to 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, although it is by no means the only one.”). 
 62.  See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 283 (1952) (permitting a U.S. court to 
enjoin actions that took place in Mexico over objections by the dissent that such an action would  
intrude on Mexico’s sovereignty). 
 63.  Justin Desautels-Stein, Extraterritoriality, Antitrust and the Pragmatist Style, 22 EMORY 
INT’L L. REV. 499, 537 (2008). 
 64.  The Fourth Circuit has so observed in the antitrust context.  See Dee-K Enterprs., Inc. v. 
Heveafil Sdn. Bhd, 299 F.3d 281, 294 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s jurisdictional analysis 
has emphasized above all else the effects, i.e., the intended location, actual location, and magnitude of 
those effects.  Quite simply, the Supreme Court has moved away from its earlier doctrine focused solely 
on the location of acts. . . .  Instead of the parties’ bright-line rules, we believe a court should properly 
engage in a more flexible and subtle inquiry.  In determining which jurisdictional test . . . applies, a 
court should consider whether the participants, acts, targets, and effects involved in an asserted antitrust 
violation are primarily foreign or primarily domestic.  This inquiry will best accommodate the cases 
with mixed fact patterns, defying ready categorization as ‘foreign’ or ‘domestic’ conduct, which our 
increasingly global economy will undoubtedly produce.  We cannot begin to foresee the scope or 
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Four major cases warrant consideration to illustrate this approach.  In 
the first case, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, the defendants 
were U.S. and foreign insurers in London that allegedly conspired to 
pressure certain primary insurers to change the terms of their commercial 
general liability insurance policies to be favorable to the defendants.65  The 
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA) demonstrates 
Congress’s intent with respect to the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial reach 
by permitting its application to conduct having a “substantial” effect on 
U.S. commerce.66  The extraterritoriality question that the Supreme Court 
of the United States faced, however, was whether the Sherman Act applied 
to the London insurers’ foreign conduct on the basis of comity concerns.67  
The Court rephrased the question more narrowly as whether it should 
refuse to apply the Sherman Act to conduct that produced a substantial 
effect in the United States out of concern that it might interfere with the 
sovereign prerogatives of the British government to regulate or encourage 
anti-competitive conduct that is illegal in the United States.68 
Taking an approach to the comity analysis that commentators have 
criticized,69 the Court declined to balance any interests involved in 
permitting or forbidding the application of U.S. antitrust law abroad and 
instead opined only on whether the exercise or conferral of jurisdiction 
would create a “true conflict between domestic and foreign law.”70  The 
 
complexity of future transactions. To adopt the simplistic rules the parties favor might well yield 
unintended and unfortunate results.” (citation omitted)); see also Société Nationale Industrielle 
Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 543–44 (1987) (adopting a case-
by-case approach to questions of conflicting discovery practices). 
 65.  509 U.S. 764, 775–76 (1993). 
 66.  Id. at 796 n.23 (“Under § 402 of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 
(FTAIA), the Sherman Act does not apply to conduct involving foreign trade or commerce, other than 
import trade or import commerce, unless ‘such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable effect’ on domestic or import commerce.  The FTAIA was intended to exempt from the 
Sherman Act export transactions that did not injure the United States economy, and it is unclear how it 
might apply to the conduct alleged here. Also unclear is whether the Act’s ‘direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable effect’ standard amends existing law or merely codifies it.  We need not address 
these questions here.  Assuming that the FTAIA’s standard affects this litigation, and assuming further 
that that standard differs from the prior law, the conduct alleged plainly meets its requirements.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 67.  Id. at 779 n.9 (“The question presented in No. 91-1128 is: ‘Did the court of appeals properly 
assess the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. antitrust laws in light of this Court’s teachings and 
contemporary understanding of international law when it held that a U.S. district court may apply U.S. 
law to the conduct of a foreign insurance market regulated abroad?’”). 
 68.  Id. at 798–99. 
 69.  E.g., HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 79–83 
(2008) (also noting the breadth of the Hartford Fire standard).. 
 70.  Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798 (quoting Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. 
Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 543–44 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and 
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majority and the dissent disagreed about whether this was a question 
subject matter or prescriptive jurisdiction.71  Provided that a person in each 
state could comply with the regulations of both countries, there was no true 
conflict “even where the foreign state has a strong policy to permit or 
encourage such conduct.”72 
In dissent from this conclusion, Justice Scalia acknowledged 
Congress’s “broad power” to “make laws applicable to persons beyond our 
territorial boundaries where United States interests are affected.”73  Rather 
than analyzing whether there was a true conflict, however, Scalia saw the 
question as one of the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction and 
congressional intent: whether Congress had in fact meant to assert 
regulatory power over the challenged conduct.74  In making this 
determination, he employed an analysis that was much more flexible than 
one might expect for the purportedly rigid exercise of statutory 
interpretation.  First, he utilized two “canons of statutory construction”: the 
presumption that unless otherwise stated Congress intends legislation to 
apply only within U.S. territory (the presumption against extraterritoriality) 
and the presumption that statutes should not be interpreted to regulate 
foreign conduct if such an interpretation would violate international law 
(also known as the Charming Betsy canon).75  Scalia concluded that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality was overcome with regard to 
antitrust statutes but that principles of prescriptive comity—the respect that 
legislatures are presumed to have for other sovereigns in limiting the reach 
of statutes—constrained the reach of the Sherman Act under the Charming 
Betsy canon.76  Deriving the standard for extraterritorial prescriptive 
jurisdiction under international law from the Restatement (Third) of 
Foreign Relations, Scalia found the question to be one of 
“reasonableness.”77  Analyzing a number of factors under the 
Restatement’s framework,78 Scalia concluded that regulating the conduct of 
 
dissenting in part)). 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. at 799. 
 73.  Id. at 813–14 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. at 814–16. 
 76.  Id.  Comity, i.e., respect for the laws and legal system of another co-equal sovereign, is a 
loosely defined, discretionary judicial canon that allows a court to exercise restraint where its 
prescriptive or jurisdictional intrusion into the affairs of another nation would be too extensive.  Donald 
Earl Childress, III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 11, 13–14 (2010). 
 77.  Id. at 817–19. 
 78.  Id. at 818–19 (“The ‘reasonableness’ inquiry turns on a number of factors including, but not 
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the London insurers would be unreasonable.79  The defendants were 
British, and the alleged wrongdoing occurred in the United Kingdom, 
which had set forth a comprehensive regulatory scheme governing the 
conduct in this area.80  Therefore, the United Kingdom’s interest in 
regulating the conduct was paramount.81 
In F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. (Empagran),82 the 
Court injected some of the considerations in Justice Scalia’s Hartford Fire 
dissent into the analysis of the reach of the Sherman Act.  Empagran once 
again involved an interpretation of the FTAIA, which requires (1) a “direct, 
substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect” on domestic commerce in the 
United States that (2) gives rise to a Sherman Act claim.83  The case 
involved one of the largest global antitrust conspiracies ever litigated: a 
price-fixing conspiracy by foreign and domestic manufacturers and 
distributors of vitamins.84  The defendants sought dismissal of the claims of 
foreign purchasers of vitamins, which were based on foreign purchase 
transactions allegedly “entirely outside of U.S. commerce.”85 
Beginning its analysis by stating the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, the Court then framed its analysis with the idea of 
“prescriptive comity.”86  It reasoned that in cases involving a foreign injury 
separable from a domestic injury, U.S. law should not “supplant” the laws 
of other nations, such as the United Kingdom, Japan, or Canada, that 
concern the best way to deal with anticompetitive conduct within their 
jurisdiction.87  Careful to carve out the reach of laws governing the conduct 
of American companies abroad, e.g., Title VII and the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act,88 the Court found no acceptable reason under international 
 
limited to: ‘the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory [of the regulating state],’ ‘the 
connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and the 
person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated,’ ‘the character of the activity to be 
regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate 
such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted,’ ‘the 
extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity,’ and ‘the likelihood of 
conflict with regulation by another state,’.” (citations omitted)). 
 79.  Id. at 819. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  See id. (holding that it would be “unimaginable” for the United States to assert prescriptive 
jurisdiction in that case absent a statutory indication of Congress’s intent to do so). 
 82.  542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
 83.  Id. at 159 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a(1)(A), (2) (2012)). 
 84.  Id. at 159–60. 
 85.  Id. at 160. 
 86.  Id. at 164. 
 87.  Id. at 165. 
 88.  Id. (“We recognize that principles of comity provide Congress greater leeway when it seeks to 
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law that made it reasonable to assume that Congress meant for the Sherman 
Act to reach foreign conduct that causes a foreign injury on the basis of 
which foreign plaintiffs have brought a claim.89  Indeed, the Court found 
nothing in or underlying the FTAIA that provided a basis for applying the 
Sherman Act to conduct so foreign in nature.90  Such an application was not 
in line with that statute’s “basic intent.”91 
Congressional intent through the lens of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality and comity concerns was also the order of the day in 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.92  There, the Supreme Court, 
through Justice Scalia, interpreted a provision of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, which, unlike the FTAIA, is silent on the question of 
extraterritorial reach.93  Foreign plaintiffs had brought an action against a 
company that was not listed on a U.S. stock exchange but whose illegal 
conduct could be said to be part of larger transactions that had an effect on 
American markets.94  In analyzing a question that it framed as one of 
“prescriptive jurisdiction,” the Court rejected the Second Circuit’s 
traditional standard that subject matter jurisdiction would exist under the 
Exchange Act if the foreign conduct had “some effect on American 
securities markets or investors” or if some conduct occurred in the United 
States.95 
The prescriptive jurisdiction question was not whether a court had the 
power to hear the case – or even whether Congress had the power to 
prescribe such conduct – but rather whether Congress did in fact intend the 
questioned provision in the Exchange Act to apply abroad.96  The Court 
could not divine any such clear intent absent some “clear” or “affirmative 
indication.”97  The Court noted that there was “no one who thought the 
[Exchange] Act was intended to ‘regulat[e]’ foreign securities exchanges – 
or indeed who even believed that under established principles of 
international law Congress had the power to do so.”98  Although it did not 
 
control through legislation the actions of American companies . . . .”). 
 89.  Id. at 166. 
 90.  Id. at 174–75. 
 91.  Id. at 174. 
 92.  130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877–78 (2010). 
 93.  Id. at 2875–76. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. at 2879. 
 96.  See id. at 2877–78 (describing the presumption against extraterritoriality and the rationale 
behind it). 
 97.  Id. at 2883 (“In short, there is no affirmative indication in the Exchange Act that § 10(b) 
applies extraterritorially, and we therefore conclude that it does not.”). 
 98.  Id. at 2884.  The Supreme Court ultimately created a transactional test that required that the 
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advocate courts straying too far from the text of a given statute, the Court 
did state that “context” might be consulted in determining the prescriptive 
reach of a given law,99 including whether the “probability” of conflicts with 
foreign laws was so high that one would undoubtedly expect Congress to 
address such conflicts in the statute.100  Here again, it is apparent that a 
number of considerations as to extraterritorial reach weighed on the Court’s 
judgment (even if only in the background), including traditional tools of 
statutory interpretation, potential for conflict with foreign laws, comity 
concerns,101 and international law.102 
In redefining the reach of the Statute, Justice Scalia wrote that the 
“focus” of the Exchange Act is on domestic transactions – purchases and 
sales of securities in the United States.  Lea Brilmayer argues that this new 
test, which has rattled commentators and attorneys alike, is an exercise in 
“judicial creativity” that “makes no pretense at all of reflecting what 
Congress wanted.”103  In fact, these doctrines are a pragmatic104 way of 
preserving a means of judicial restraint in circumstances wherein judges 
fear that broad interpretations approach an imagined tipping point of 
encroachment on other states’ sovereignty.105 
In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Court reinforced the 
Morrison approach in the context of prescriptive jurisdiction questions 
relating to the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).106  Kiobel involved claims of 
former Nigerian citizens against British and Dutch corporations and a 
 
there be a transaction within the United States or of shares traded on domestic securities exchanges for 
the Exchange Act to apply.  Id. at 2888. 
 99.  Id. at 2883. 
 100.  Id. at 2885 (“Like the United States, foreign countries regulate their domestic securities 
exchanges and securities transactions occurring within their territorial jurisdiction. And the regulation 
of other countries often differs from ours as to what constitutes fraud, what disclosures must be made, 
what damages are recoverable, what discovery is available in litigation, what individual actions may be 
joined in a single suit, what attorney’s fees are recoverable, and many other matters.”). 
 101.  The Court noted the views of various amici, including foreign governments, who complained 
of potential interference with their laws.  Id. at 2885–86. 
 102.  See id. at 2887 (considering the argument that the significant and material conduct test may 
be in accord with “prevailing notions of international comity” and thus with customary international 
law). 
 103.  Lea Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Legislative 
Supremacy, and the Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 40 
SOUTHWESTERN L. REV. 655, 656–57 (2011). 
 104.  Desautels-Stein, supra note 63, at 535–37 (concentrating on the pragmatic style of the 
Empagran decision). 
 105.  See infra Part IV. 
 106.  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”); 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663–64 (2013). 
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Nigerian subsidiary for human rights atrocities committed in conjunction 
with the Nigerian government.107  The Court had no problem applying the 
Morrison approach to the ATS, a jurisdictional statute that concerns causes 
of action drawn from common law.108  As in Morrison, the Court 
concluded that the presumption against extraterritoriality coupled with the 
text, history, and purposes of the ATS proved that the statute was not 
intended to apply to foreign parties engaged in conduct occurring entirely 
abroad.109  In this way, the Court indirectly took into account international 
norms, noting that applying the ATS to these facts would make the U.S. 
“uniquely hospitable” to the enforcement of international norms in its 
courts and would have significant foreign policy implications.110  In 
addition, as in Morrison, the Court noted that such an extraterritorial 
extension of the statute is objectionable to other nations, which have lodged 
objections to its use for foreign conduct.111  The Court’s concerns with 
international comity, or rather the fear that over-intrusion into the 
jurisdiction of other sovereigns would provoke a similar and unwanted 
intrusion into U.S jurisdiction over its territory and citizens, are also 
evident.112 
Kiobel solidified Morrison’s and Empagran’s congressional intent 
approach to prescriptive jurisdiction, but the majority and the concurrence 
were divided on which canon of statutory interpretation to apply to the 
ATS.  The majority favored the presumption against extraterritoriality,113 
while the concurrence favored interpreting the ATS in line with 
international jurisdictional principles.114  Future cases are likely to see 
similar debates, but the approach of both sides in Kiobel notably adheres to 
the framework that Justice Scalia began in his dissent in Hartford Fire and 
that has captured every member of the court in the decisions described in 
this Section. 
 
 107.  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662–63. 
 108.  Id. at 1664–65.  FSIA similarly reaches out to other state and federal law for the causes of 
action.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (2012) (looking to state law for liability of a foreign state). 
 109.  Id. at 1665–69. 
 110.  Id.  In a concurrence, Justice Breyer stated that he would base the reach of the statute on 
international norms of jurisdiction, an inquiry for which the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
would be “helpful.”  Id. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 111.  Id. at 1668–69. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. at 1664–65. 
 114.  Id. at 1673. 
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C. Scholarly Debate on Determining the Prescriptive Reach of Statutes 
Generally 
Scholarly debate concerning the degree of appropriate extraterritorial 
intrusion into the jurisdiction of other states did not begin with the 
decisions above.115  Those decisions, however, especially Morrison, have 
generated many new proposals to reinvent the presumption (or canon) 
against extraterritoriality.  Most commentators agree that some sort of limit 
must be placed on extraterritorial jurisdiction.  And scholars have reached a 
nebulous agreement that the international law of jurisdiction, to the extent 
ascertainable, should in some way factor into the determination of whether 
and the extent to which a statute is applied extraterritorially. 
For example, Professor John Knox argues that courts facing an issue 
of prescriptive jurisdiction should ask two questions: (1) whether “under 
international law” the United States has “primary” jurisdiction, meaning 
that there is a well-accepted, nearly undeniable basis for U.S. court 
jurisdiction under international law, and (2) whether there is any basis 
under international law for jurisdiction.116  If there is primary jurisdiction, 
the court would almost assuredly apply the statute, but if there is only some 
basis under international law, then the court would apply it only if there 
was some evidence of congressional intent to do so.117  If, in the more 
extreme case, absolutely no basis for jurisdiction exists, the U.S court 
would only apply the statute if it contained an “inescapably clear statement 
of congressional intent.”118   
Anthony Colangelo argues that the extent of extraterritorial 
application may depend on the source of the lawmaking power: whether a 
statute implements international law or is rather a unilateral exercise of 
Congress’s constitutional powers.119  Statutes that implement international 
law, such as the Alien Tort Statute, may extend further than those that do 
not.120 
Finally, Jeffrey A. Meyer attempts to bridge the gap between 
“territorialists” (those who only favor extraterritorial application when 
there is an unmistakably clear statement on the part of Congress), 
 
 115.  For an excellent position on the interesting balancing approach in the Restatement, see Harold 
G. Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 579, 582–88 (1983). 
 116.  John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 351, 360–
61 (2010). 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Anthony J. Coangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1030–
32 (2011). 
 120.  Id. 
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“universalists” (who, at their most extreme, favor application of U.S. law 
whenever there is any effect or interference in the United States), and 
“interest balancers” (who favor a balance of each state’s interests in 
regulating the conduct, depending on the extent of the state’s connection 
with a particular jurisdiction).121  Meyer argues that courts should only 
apply “geoambiguous” law extraterritorially when the conduct would be 
illegal in both national jurisdictions.122 
A resolution of this debate and a determination of which of these 
proposals is optimal is beyond the scope of this Article.  They are noted 
here only because they show that the concerns of scholars very much 
reflect the concerns of the courts.  And it is those common concerns that 
need to be brought to bear in determining the extent of FSIA’s 
extraterritorial reach.  To summarize those concerns, they are: (1) 
deference to the norms of international law; (2) extra-legal diplomatic or 
foreign relations concerns; (3) comity or respect for sovereign prerogatives 
of internal regulation; and (4) separation of powers or adherence to 
congressional intent and non-interference in executive prerogatives.123 
In the midst of the debate about the implications of the Morrison 
decision, however, Katherine Florey points out the importance of 
uniformity in approaches to extraterritoriality under federal and state 
law.124  Professor Florey builds on Lea Brilmayer’s article comparing 
federal extraterritoriality considerations to state conflicts of laws 
 
 121.  Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for Extraterritorial 
Application of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110, 114–18 (2011). 
 122.  Id. at 118–21. 
 123.  These concerns have been stated in different ways by different courts and scholars.  The 
Ninth Circuit, in articulating a “rule of reason” interest balancing for extraterritorial application of U.S. 
antitrust law—similar to a balancing of interests that occurs under conflicts of law principles—noted: 
The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the 
nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of business of 
corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve 
compliance, the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those 
elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American 
commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the violations 
charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad.  A court 
evaluating these factors should identify the potential degree of conflict if American authority 
is asserted.  A difference in law or policy is one likely sore spot, though one which may not 
always be present.  Nationality is another; though foreign governments may have some 
concern for the treatment of American citizens and business residing there, they primarily 
care about their own nationals.  Having assessed the conflict, the court should then determine 
whether in the face of it the contacts and interests of the United States are sufficient to support 
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 614–15 (9th Cir. 1976) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 124.  Katherine Florey, State Law, U.S. Power, Foreign Disputes: Understanding the 
Extraterritorial Effects of State Law in the Wake of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 92 B.U. L. 
REV. 535, 535–38 (2012). 
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principles.125  Specifically, Florey examines long-arm jurisdiction under 
state law across national borders, its difference from the federal approach, 
and the implications or dangers of turning to state law claims to reach 
foreign conduct post-Morrison.126  Florey discusses how states tend to view 
the application of their law, which may be common law rather than 
statutory law, as a question of “choice of law” rather than prescriptive 
jurisdiction.127  In other words, Florey observes that, because state choice 
of law analysis remains “rooted in the interstate context,” state courts 
generally do not frame such analysis any differently depending on whether 
the law is another state’s law or a foreign nation’s law.128  None of the 
approaches embodied in the Restatements on Conflict of Laws—i.e., the 
more territorial vested rights approach and the more flexible most 
significant relationship approach—are as sensitive to foreign relations 
concerns as the federal approach.129 
Professor Florey also observes that the constitutional constraints on 
the “extraterritorial” application of state law are typically satisfied if 
minimum jurisdictional contacts are present, which is actually a lower 
standard than the “interest” needed for forum law to apply.130  Although she 
ultimately concludes that the state law puzzle should point toward a “less 
exacting application of the presumption against extraterritoriality in federal 
law,” she does tend toward the adoption of a more integrated approach 
between the two.131  She argues that, while the presumption against 
extraterritoriality may be inapplicable in the state law context because 
courts are applying common law, states should incorporate comity 
concerns and some form of a “within-jurisdiction effects” test into their 
analyses.132  As implied above, Florey’s analysis has a great deal of 
relevance to the interpretation of FSIA’s direct effect provision, which is 
often treated as the awkward federal cousin of state long-arm statues.133 
D. Scholarship on FSIA’s Direct Effect Provision 
Scholarship on the direct effect provision of FSIA’s commercial 
activities exception is not ample.  Those commentators that have ventured 
 
 125.  Brilmayer, supra note 51, at 13–15. 
 126.  Florey, supra note 124, at 536. 
 127.  Id. at 537–38. 
 128.  Id. at 551. 
 129.  Id. at 557–58. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. at 564. 
 132.  Id. at 573–75. 
 133.  See infra Part IV. 
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into this area, however, tend to argue for the adoption of a test that is more 
in line with accepted bases for jurisdiction under international law—i.e., 
one that would analyze whether the character of the effect is substantial and 
foreseeable.134  Joseph Dellapenna argues in his preeminent treatise on 
suing foreign governments and their corporations that FSIA’s effects 
provision should be interpreted in accordance with the Restatement (Third) 
of Foreign Relations.135  More specifically, he advocates for the application 
of the interest balancing described in the Restatement (Third) between 
considerations of “the burden on an American court . . . fairness to the 
parties, and the possibility of affront to a foreign government with a 
resultant embarrassment to the foreign relations of the United States.”136 
Other scholarship argues that international and domestic tests of 
fairness may not be materially different.  Karen Halverson examines the 
jurisdictional nexus generally required under all three clauses of the 
commercial activities exception—as well as other exceptions—and 
compares them to the nexus necessary to meet the due process adjudicatory 
jurisdiction standard.137  She cites precedent, like that described above, 
which finds the two requirements to be nearly the same.138  But she argues 
that it is perhaps not necessary to determine whether a foreign state is a 
person under the Fifth Amendment and, therefore, whether constitutional 
due process under FSIA is necessary because customary international law, 
as embodied in the Restatement (Third), is an equally adequate guide to 
fairness.139  She argues this, even though, as she acknowledges, FSIA may 
exceed international bounds in some provisions, such as Section 1605A, 
which provides for jurisdiction over claims arising from state-sponsored 
terrorist activities that injure U.S. citizens whether abroad or in the United 
States.140  Halverson’s approach, while avoiding the difficult question of 
 
 134.  See, e.g., Hadwin A. Card III, Note, Interpreting the Direct Effects Clause of the FSIA’s 
Commercial Activity Exception, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 91, 91–93 (1990) (arguing for an adoption of the 
Restatement’s approach); Heidi L. Frostestad, Voest-Alpine Trading v. Bank of China: Can a Uniform 
Interpretation of a “Direct Effect” Be Attained Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of 
1976, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 515, 550–51 (2000) (proposing a new statute incorporating the legally 
significant act test and adopting the substantial and foreseeable test from the Restatement as a 
secondary concern). 
 135.  JOSEPH DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS 239–41 
(2d ed. 2003). 
 136.  Id. at 240–41. 
 137.  Karen Halverson, Is a Foreign State A “Person”? Does It Matter?: Personal Jurisdiction, 
Due Process, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 115, 157–58 
(2001). 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. at 185–87. 
 140.  Id. at 167–72. 
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due process application, is complicated by the layers of analysis introduced 
subsequent to its publication in the Empagran and Morrison decisions.141  
Those layers include the proper contours of an inquiry into congressional 
intent, the distinction between prescriptive and adjudicatory jurisdiction, 
and the function of a presumption against extraterritoriality.142  In addition, 
as will be argued below, an inquiry into international standards need not be 
based solely on the Restatement (Third), which may provide less insight in 
terms of other legal systems involved.143 
These approaches may be helpful for courts looking to simplify their 
inquiry into the extent of FSIA’s reach by combining the international law 
analysis with the due process prong of personal jurisdiction, but as the 
remainder of this Article will address, that approach is not necessarily 
equivalent to the more delicate balance of congressional intent and comity 
concerns that the Supreme Court has applied in other extraterritoriality 
cases. 
Before proceeding to that analysis, however, the next section 
examines the various tests that courts have used to cope with the meaning 
of “direct effect” under FSIA and analyzes the utility of those approaches. 
III. PHASES OF FSIA-EFFECTS LITIGATION IN THE U.S. COURTS 
Courts have gone through several phases in the litigation of the direct 
effect provision.  The earliest of cases interpreted the provision in line with 
a typical long-arm and minimum contacts personal jurisdiction analysis that 
would occur under the Washington, D.C., long-arm statute.  Courts based 
this conclusion on a specific reference to the statute within FSIA’s 
legislative history.144  This analysis appears to have gone hand in hand with 
a discomfort with FSIA’s apparent authorization of personal jurisdiction if 
service of process is properly executed within the statute’s requirements 
and if one of the immunity exceptions applies.145  As noted above, this 
 
 141.  See supra Section II.B. 
 142.  See supra Section II.B. 
 143.  See, e.g., Peter Charles Choharis, U.S. Courts and the International Law of Expropriation: 
Toward a New Model for Breach of Contract, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2006) (“[T]he Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (“Restatement (Third)”)—a leading resource for 
U.S. courts deciding issues of international law—often does not reflect current U.S. law and, in a 
number of places, is analytically incomplete or otherwise unsound.”). 
 144.  E.g., Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264, 266 (D.D.C. 1978); see also E. Eur. 
Domestic Int’l Sales Corp. v. Terra, 467 F. Supp. 383, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating that FSIA “is 
intended to be a long arm statute modeled after the District of Columbia long arm statute”); Nat’l Amer. 
Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 638–39 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (comparing FSIA direct 
effect provision to long-arm statute). 
 145.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (2012) (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to 
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arrangement left courts wondering whether due process comes into play.  
Although, as will be discussed below, the Supreme Court has questioned 
the legal necessity of conducting a due process analysis for a suit involving 
a foreign state, one can hardly blame courts that conducted, and still 
conduct, the minimum contacts analysis to reduce the chances of reversal 
in light of the confusion in the law.  As one court succinctly stated: 
 
  The “direct effect” requirement . . . is apparently intended, in part, to 
ensure that there is “some connection between the lawsuit and the United 
States” thereby assuring that the exercise of the court’s personal 
jurisdiction over the foreign state under section 1330(b) comports with 
the minimum contacts standard set forth in International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington and McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.  Therefore, 
the “direct effect” exception . . . requires not only that there be an 
immediate causal effect within the United States but also that there be 
sufficient minimum contacts between the matter in controversy and the 
United States to support the court’s exercise of in personam 
jurisdiction.146 
 
The assumption seems to be that a direct effect can be roughly or 
exactly equivalent to the connection necessary to establish the minimum 
contacts for due process.147  The precedent is not necessarily limited to the 
direct effect provision under the commercial activities exception.  Indeed, 
as Karen Halverson asserted, the territorial nexus required under any clause 
of that exception might be analogized to minimum contacts.148 
 
every claim for relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service 
has been made under section 1608 of this title.”).  In some cases, courts have assumed that they needed 
to conduct a due process analysis without just relying on the literal operation of the statute.  See, e.g., 
Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 1988) (reading due process into § 
1330(b) by means of the legislative history). 
 146.  Decor by Nikkei Int’l, Inc. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 497 F. Supp. 893, 903–04 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980) (citations omitted). 
 147.  See, e.g., Velidor v. L/P/G Benghazi, 653 F.2d 812, 819–20 (3d Cir. 1981) (equating direct 
effect with the contacts necessary for personal jurisdiction); Thomas P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo 
Nacional de Producción de Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247, 1255 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The words ‘direct effect’ 
in the clause cited by Gonzalez have been interpreted as embodying the minimum contacts standard of 
International Shoe Co. and the requirement of Hanson that the defendant purposely avail itself of the 
privilege of conducting business within the forum.” (citations omitted)); Carey v. Nat’l Oil Corp., 592 
F.2d 673, 676 (2d Cir. 1979) (“The legislative history of this section makes clear that it embodies the 
standard set out in International Shoe Co. v. Washington . . . .” (citations omitted)); Maizus v. Weldor 
Trust Reg., 820 F. Supp. 101, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (minimum contacts); Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. 
Empresa Minera del Centro del Perú S.A., 595 F. Supp. 502, 504–05 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (minimum 
contacts); Gibbons v. Údarás na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 1117 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (minimum 
contacts); Osen v. Republic of Fr., No. 79 Civ. 0972, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12646, at *14–15 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 1981) (minimum contacts). 
 148.  See supra Section II.D. 
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While not necessarily equating the personal jurisdiction analysis to the 
territorial nexus required for the commercial activities exception, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has argued that the 
two are undeniably related.  In Rein v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, the Second Circuit had before it an interlocutory appeal from 
the district court’s dismissal of various challenges to its jurisdiction under 
the exception in FSIA permitting suit for state-sponsored terrorist activities 
against U.S. citizens.149  Because of the procedural posture of the case, the 
Second Circuit had to decide whether to review the defendant’s objections 
to both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.150  The court noted that 
personal and subject matter jurisdiction are certainly statutorily inter-
related in FSIA: subject matter jurisdiction is conferred under 28 U.S.C. § 
1330(a) by virtue of the application of an exception to immunity under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1605–07,151 and the satisfaction of subject matter jurisdiction and 
proper service of process are the statutory prerequisites for personal 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b).152  But that says nothing of the due 
process analysis that might be necessary and also related or in certain cases 
even identical to the jurisdictional nexus required under some of the 
exceptions to immunity, including the direct effect provision.153 The court 
concluded it is also “possible that a foreign sovereign could be subject to 
subject matter jurisdiction under the commercial activities exception 
without being within the personal jurisdiction of an American court.”154  
Ultimately, the review of these two issues could proceed separately.155  
Although the court did not make this point, this Article will later argue that 
the major point of caution regarding the relevance of these tests is that 
merging them conflates domestic and international analogies and leads to 
distortion of separate policy concerns.156 
The Rein case appeared after the Supreme Court had given significant 
guidance on the commercial activity exception.  But the much earlier 
comparisons between the direct effect provision and the concept of 
 
 149.  162 F.3d 748, 753–54 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. at 759. 
 153.  See id. at 759–61 & n.8 (noting that in another case the nexus to the United States under the 
commercial activity exception could be equivalent to the minimum contacts necessary for due process 
but that this equivalence is not necessarily the case).  Moreover, by the time of this case, the Supreme 
Court had questioned the applicability of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to foreign 
sovereigns.  See infra notes 192–206 and accompanying text. 
 154.  Rein, 162 F.3d at 760 n.8. 
 155.  Id. at 759. 
 156.  See infra Section IV.A. 
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minimum contacts were at first blush quite logical, given that certain state 
long-arm statutes authorize jurisdiction to the limits of the due process 
clause.157  Other courts noted, however, that direct effect could mean 
something more than “only the degree of effect necessary to satisfy due 
process requirements.”158  This interpretation might also have some force 
because conflict of law analysis could demand something different than 
minimum contacts.159  For these courts, satisfaction of the direct effect 
requirement meant that the lesser minimum contacts requirement was 
established.160 
It is also conceivable that Congress, under the direct effect test, 
exercised its broad prescriptive powers to cover conduct with a territorial 
connection that is less than one necessary to comport with the minimum 
contacts requirement, given the unique nature of foreign sovereign 
defendants.  The language of the statute only requires that there be an 
unqualified effect, no matter how large or small, and that it be direct, 
meaning not too attenuated in the chain of causal events.  Comparatively, 
in the antitrust context, the effect must be substantial and foreseeable.  If it 
had been concerned, Congress would arguably have specified the degree of 
effect necessary in FSIA’s text.  Still, because courts, including the 
Supreme Court, have been unwilling to stray too far from the territoriality 
principle regardless of whether a case involves international or domestic 
jurisdiction, it is easy to imagine why courts in FSIA cases have 
continually sought something more than simply any U.S.-based effect with 
an un-attenuated causal linkage.161 
In contrast to courts that, because of the reference to the D.C. long-
arm statute in FSIA’s legislative history, viewed the direct effect inquiry as 
an analysis of jurisdiction to adjudicate, other courts focused on the 
reference in the legislative history to the Restatement (Second) of Foreign 
Relations and its section on prescriptive jurisdiction.  Those courts 
 
 157.  See GARY BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS 82–83 (5th ed. 2011) (discussing various types of state long-arm statutes).  The 
personal jurisdiction inquiry should be informative but never determinative of the meaning of the direct 
effect provision.  See infra Section IV.A. 
 158.  Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056, 1065 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). 
 159.  See Florey, supra note 124, at 557. 
 160.  See, e.g., Shapiro v. Republic of Bol., 930 F.2d 1013, 1018–20 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that 
the commercial activity exception requires a closer nexus than that necessary for minimum contacts). 
 161.  See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789–90 (2011) (emphasizing 
purposeful availment of the forum rather than a more liberal stream of commerce theory of personal 
jurisdiction and creating a high standard that there must be evidence of an intent to submit to the laws 
governing the territory of a particular sovereign or rather evidence that the defendant was “targeting” 
the forum). 
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interpreted the reference to the Restatement to mean that the effect in the 
United States had to be “substantial, and a foreseeable consequence of the 
actions performed elsewhere.”162  This prescriptive jurisdiction analysis, 
however, did not always obviate the need for the minimum contacts 
analysis, which some of these courts viewed as distinct.163  At worst, this 
analysis is truncated and superficial.  Some of the more significantly 
reasoned decisions, however, remained sensitive to foreign relations by 
balancing the interests of the nations involved in conjunction with the test 
under the Restatement (Second).164 
For example, in Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., U.S. citizens living in 
Texas brought suit against a Mexican bank.165  In the wake of dramatic 
changes in foreign exchange control regulations and nationalization of 
banks, this bank had paid out on the plaintiffs’ U.S. dollar-denominated 
deposits in pesos, thereby substantially reducing their value.166  In 
determining whether the defendant bank’s activities had the requisite direct 
effect in the United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit eschewed a narrow interpretation of precedent that would have 
required payment to be called for in the United States before a direct effect 
could be established.167  Rather, the court held that the direct effect existed 
 
 162.  E.g., Ohntrup v. Firearms Ctr., Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1281, 1286–87 (E.D. Pa. 1981); see also 
Am. W. Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793, 798–800 (9th Cir. 1989) (“In short, this 
Circuit is in agreement with most courts analyzing the ‘direct effect’ clause of section 1605(a)(2).  A 
foreign sovereign’s activities must cause an effect in the United States that is substantial and 
foreseeable in order to abrogate sovereign immunity.”); Zernicek v. Brown & Root, Inc., 826 F.2d 415, 
418–19 (5th Cir. 1987) (“The direct-effects clause in the FSIA differs from ‘direct-effect’ clauses found 
in many state long-arm statutes, because the FSIA clause is explicitly intended to encompass effects 
resulting from commercial as well as tortious activities.  The ‘substantial’ and ‘direct and foreseeable’ 
standards set forth in § 18 of the Restatement are likewise intended to apply in commercial contexts.”); 
Transamerican S.S. Corp. v. Som. Democratic Republic, 767 F.2d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(“[C]ourts construing the ‘direct effect’ language may look for guidance to section 18 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1965) concerning the extent to 
which a state may enact laws proscribing conduct outside its territory to prevent effects of that conduct 
within the state.  Thus, we stressed in Maritime that the effects in the United States should be both 
‘substantial’ and ‘direct and foreseeable’ in order to satisfy the requirements of clause 3 of the section 
1605(a)(2) exception.”); Ohntrup v. Firearms, Ctr., Inc., No. 84-1468, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 22059, at 
*3–4 (3d Cir. Mar. 26, 1985) (“We also agree with the district court that the injury in the United States 
of a purchaser of a pistol was both a substantial and foreseeable consequence of Makina’s actions and 
came within the exception for commercial acts which cause a ‘direct effect’ in the United States.”); 
Wilk v. Creditanstalt Bankverein Int’l, No. 92 Civ. 1748 (JFK), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3964, at *10–11 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1993) (relying on the Restatement (2d)). 
 163.  E.g., Ohntrup, 516 F. Supp. at 1286–87. 
 164.  Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1110–12 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 165.  Id. at 1105. 
 166.  Id. at 1106. 
 167.  See id. at 1112 (holding the place of payment not decisive). 
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because the plaintiffs were physically located in the United States and the 
effects of the conversion “were inevitably felt by them [in Texas].”168  In 
supporting this nexus, which the court said was foreseeable in light of the 
defendants’ on-going course of business conduct with the plaintiffs over 
several years, the court also turned to the purposes behind FSIA and the 
balance that the nexus requirement in the commercial activities exception 
maintains.169  In other words, the connection to the United States through 
the direct effect provision preserves the independence of different 
sovereigns at different times.  Where the U.S. nexus is weak and the 
foreign state’s interest is likely stronger, then immunity from suit in the 
United States will be granted.170  Where the nexus with the United States is 
strong and the foreign state’s interest is arguably weaker, then no immunity 
will be given.171  Therefore, because the defendants had engaged in a long-
standing commercial transaction with U.S. citizens in the United States, the 
nexus was strong, as was the U.S. interest in providing a forum to its 
residents, who suffered serious financial harm because of the cross-border 
transactions.172  Mexico’s interest was “not so great,” said the court, 
because the transaction was commercial and non-sovereign.173  This type of 
interest balancing applies more flexible foreign relations concerns to an 
analysis of FSIA’s text.174 
Before beginning a discussion of the more substantial and influential 
circuit court and Supreme Court precedent in this area, one additional 
phenomenon is worthy of note because it illustrates the failure of the legal 
inquiries above to provide a meaningful framework for analysis.  Many 
courts, regardless of the test, if any, that they have adopted, have relied 
heavily on comparisons with the factual scenarios in prior cases.  The 
courts have reached results based almost solely on whether the facts were 
sufficiently similar to those in other cases wherein a circuit had found a 
 
 168.  Id. at 1111–12. 
 169.  Id. at 1112. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id.. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  The court noted that sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine, which is a defense on 
the merits that prohibits a court from adjudicating the validity of an act of a foreign state, are based in 
principles of international comity.  Id. at 1125.  The comity balance under the act of state doctrine in 
that case weighed in favor of the defendant, whereas the sovereign immunity balance weighed in favor 
of the plaintiff.  Id. at 1125–26.  Similarly disparate results might be said to occur with regard to the 
personal jurisdiction due process analysis, which incorporates some principles of international comity 
into its reasonableness test, and the comity analysis under prescriptive jurisdiction.  See infra Section 
IV. 
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direct effect.175  Nearly all courts have acknowledged that the determination 
of what constitutes a “direct effect” is a complex and ambiguous enterprise 
fraught with artifice,176 so the temptation to rely on factual comparisons is 
understandable.  For example, the Supreme Court agrees that where 
payment is made to a designated institution in the United States, the loss is 
felt there and therefore constitutes a direct effect.177  The effect is sufficient 
regardless of whether the plaintiff is American or foreign.178  When an 
American citizen is injured abroad, however, the consequences to the 
citizen’s health and well-being of that intentional or negligent tort do not 
constitute a direct effect.179  Rather, the direct effect is the injury itself, 
whereas the consequences flowing from that injury are one step removed 
and, therefore, not sufficiently direct to comply with FSIA.180  The 
following cases show how confusion has deepened and, despite a number 
of opportunities to consider these issues, no truly useful approach has 
emerged. 
In Texas Trading Co. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Second 
Circuit devised a five-part inquiry to resolve not only direct effects cases 
but also all FSIA-related commercial activity cases.181  The defendant, the 
 
 175.  E.g., Erickson v. Alitalie Linee Aeree Italiane, No. 90-3895 (CSF), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
8256, at *15–18 (D.N.J. June 5, 1991) (no direct effect of negligent act abroad); Crimson 
Semiconductor, Inc. v. Electronum, 629 F. Supp. 903, 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“The loss to plaintiff—the 
benefit of its bargain—is the same as the loss to the sellers in Texas Trading and Schmidt.  This effect 
provides an adequate nexus between the cause of action and the United States.  The FSIA confers 
subject-matter jurisdiction upon this court.”); Tucker v. Whitaker Travel, Ltd., 620 F. Supp. 578, 586 
(E.D. Pa. 1985) (injury abroad not a direct effect in the United States); Zernicek v. Petróleos Mexicanos 
(Pemex), 614 F. Supp. 407, 413 (S.D. Tex. 1985) (“In short, courts have uniformly held that a personal 
injury suffered outside the United States does not form a basis for jurisdiction under the third clause [of 
the FSIA], even if the injury lingers after the plaintiff returns to the United States.”); Keller v. 
Transportes Aéreos Militares Ecuadorianos, 601 F. Supp. 787, 790 (D.D.C. 1985) (facts of this case are 
“indistinguishable” from those of other cases); Tigchon v. Island of Jam., 591 F. Supp. 765, 767–68 
(W.D. Mich. 1984) (“[T]he connections between defendant, plaintiff’s injury, and the United States, are 
even more remote than those in Harris and In re Air Disaster.”); Reale Int’l, Inc. v. Fed. Republic of 
Nigeria, 562 F. Supp. 54, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (“The facts in the case at bar fall squarely within Texas 
Trading, and I hold that plaintiff’s cause of action falls within the FSIA.”); In re Disaster at Riyadh 
Airport, on Aug. 19, 1980, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15608, at *6–7 (D.D.C. July 17, 1981) (causing 
personal injury to American citizens abroad not a direct effect); Dorrian v. Canadian Pac. Hotels, Ltd., 
No. 80-1740, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16523, at *9-11 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 1980) (comparing injuries 
outside of the United States to the factual scenario in Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 
1056, 1060 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)). 
 176.  See, e.g, Tex. Trading Co. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981) 
(discussing a court’s role in deciphering the complexities of FSIA). 
 177.  E.g., Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992). 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  See, e.g,, Zernicek, 614 F. Supp. at 413. 
 180.  See id. 
 181.  647 F.2d at 308. 
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government of Nigeria, had entered into numerous contracts with foreign 
entities for the sale of cement to fund its rapid economic growth and 
development.182  The financial arrangements in the contracts contemplated 
payment on letters of credit, issued by Nigeria, at banks that were primarily 
located in New York.183  When the cement was no longer needed, Nigeria 
ordered its financial agents not to make good on the arrangements.184  After 
attempts to settle had failed, several suits were brought in federal court in 
New York.185 
The Second Circuit first determined whether the commercial activity 
bore some relation to the cause of action and to the United States, which 
are requirements common to each of the three clauses in Section 1605 
(a)(2).186  This question was one of congressional intent.187  Next the court 
determined whether it had federal question or diversity jurisdiction under 
Article III and whether the facts met the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1330 
(a).188  Finally, the court engaged in an analysis to ensure that personal 
jurisdiction comported with due process.189 
The Second Circuit’s analysis offers much on a conceptual level 
because it makes the jurisdictional inquiry more detailed and rigorous.  In 
other words, it examines the questions of adjudicative jurisdiction more 
discretely than the text of FSIA expressly requires.  The Second Circuit’s 
now-defunct test provided the most comprehensive method to ensure that a 
case involving a foreign sovereign is properly before a court.  For that 
reason, it gained popularity until it was, as the cases below illustrate, called 
into question in different ways by decisions of the Supreme Court. 
It is also notable that, in analyzing whether Nigeria’s nonpayment and 
breach had a direct effect in the United States, the Second Circuit rejected 
the analytical framework derived from the Restatement (Second) and 
therefore did not analyze whether that effect needed to be substantial or 
foreseeable.190  The court determined that Congress did not intend for the 
words “direct effect” to be limited in such a way and that the Restatement’s 
 
 182.  Id. at 303. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id. at 305. 
 185.  Id. at 306. 
 186.  Id. at 308. 
 187.  Id. at 308–09. 
 188.  Id. at 308. That section is the subject matter jurisdiction section of FSIA, permitting 
jurisdiction only if the action falls within an exception in sections 1605 and 1607.  28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) 
(2012). 
 189.  Id. at 308. 
 190.  Id. at 311. 
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test was meant for prescriptive rather than adjudicative jurisdiction.191  The 
court did not consider that, under its direct effect provision, FSIA is 
prescribing a federal immunity standard to conduct that may be otherwise 
immune abroad. 
Instead, the court concluded that the effect of Nigeria’s conduct was 
sufficiently direct and sufficiently within the United States because Nigeria 
breached contracts with companies that were “American corporation[s]” 
and because the contracts called for the plaintiffs to present documents and 
collect money in banks in the United States.192  While this analysis did not 
define a test or approach for determining the circumstances or conduct that 
constitute a direct effect, it did lay the groundwork for the Second Circuit’s 
legally significant act test in a later case. 
That case, Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina,193 gave both the 
Second Circuit and the Supreme Court the chance to redefine the direct 
effect inquiry under FSIA.  Weltover involved Argentina’s failure to pay 
the principal and interest due on bonds that it had issued to bolster its 
foreign exchange reserves.194  The relevant principal and interest payments 
were due to be paid in New York to the defendants, who were private 
investors.195  The district court had rejected Argentina’s motion to dismiss, 
in which Argentina had argued that its issuance of bonds under the 
circumstances did not constitute commercial activities under FSIA, and the 
Second Circuit affirmed.196  Concluding that the bond transactions were 
commercial activity, the Second Circuit broke them down into their legally 
significant parts or acts.  It held that the legally significant act, “the 
defendants’ failure to abide by the contractual terms, i.e., to make payments 
in New York,” caused the effect that “the Plaintiffs’ accounts were not 
 
 191.  The court opined: 
The reference [to the Restatement Second § 18] is a bit of a non sequitur, since § 18 concerns 
the extent to which substantive American law may be applied to conduct overseas, not the 
proper extraterritorial jurisdictional reach of American courts n’importe quelle substantive 
law.  Nor is the House Report’s vague reference to the District of Columbia’s long-arm 
statute especially helpful; that provision looks to personal jurisdiction, not subject matter 
jurisdiction, and in any event is concerned in its “effects” provision only with torts.  We are 
left with the words, “direct effect in the United States,” and with Congress’s broad mandate in 
passing the FSIA: “Under section 1605(a)(2), no act of a foreign state, tortious or not, which 
is connected with the commercial activities of a foreign state would give rise to immunity if 
the act takes place in the United States or has a direct effect within the United States.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 192.  Id. at 312. 
 193.  941 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1991), aff’d, 504 U.S. 607 (1992). 
 194.  Id. at 147–48. 
 195.  Id. at 148. 
 196.  Id. 
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credited with the outstanding amount in U.S. dollars.”197 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and made several conclusions 
with significant implications for the remainder of this analysis.198  First, the 
Court affirmed the broad approach to determining what constitutes a 
commercial activity.  In other words, the issuance of bonds, while meant to 
help regulate the Argentinean economy, could be viewed as a private 
commercial activity if analyzed according to its nature and not its 
purpose.199  This conclusion allows courts to extend jurisdiction to an 
expansive range of foreign sovereign activities and to aggressively protect 
the rights of private investors in government-sponsored commercial 
ventures. 
Second, the Court could find nothing in FSIA or its context that 
required a determination that the effect was substantial and foreseeable, as 
described in the Restatement.200  Indeed, it cautioned courts not to stray too 
far from the congressional intent embodied in FSIA’s text.201  In the wake 
of that conclusion, the Court articulated no alternative test for what is a 
sufficiently direct effect in the United States.  Instead the Court stated that 
the effect of Argentina’s breach was clearly directly felt in the United 
States.202  But, the Court also continued to create uncertainty in the law by 
noting its doubt that the citizenship of the plaintiff, i.e., American or 
foreign, is relevant to the determination of whether the effect is sufficiently 
“in the United States.”203  Furthermore, it expressed doubt as to whether a 
foreign sovereign is a “person” for purposes of the due process clause of 
the Fifth Amendment, creating significant uncertainty as to the 
applicability of the International Shoe minimum contacts and Hansen v. 
Denckla purposeful availment analyses.  These analyses had provided the 
rubric for courts to discern whether a case had the requisite nexus with the 
United States for the various purposes detailed above.204  The Court 
dropped a convenient reference to a prior case that held that U.S. states are 
not persons for purposes of the due process clause and simply noted that, in 
any event, minimum contacts would have been satisfied on the facts of the 
case.205 
 
 197.  Id. at 153 (emphasis added). 
 198.  Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 609–10 (1992). 
 199.  Id. at 612. 
 200.  Id. at 617–18. 
 201.  Id. at 618. 
 202.  Id. at 618–19. 
 203.  Id. at 619. 
 204.  Id. at 619–20. 
 205.  Id. (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323–24 (1966)). 
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Finally, the Court’s decision is also significant for what it did not 
include: any comment on the appropriateness of the Second Circuit’s 
legally significant act analysis.  Post-Weltover, that test continues to be the 
law of the Second Circuit as well as other circuits that have adopted the 
formulation.206  Its continued validity notwithstanding, the test has incurred 
meaningful criticism and has been rejected by other circuits.207 
In Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China,208 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declined to adopt the legally 
significant act test.  Voest-Alpine involved the Bank of China’s failure to 
make good on a letter of credit as payment for a shipment by the plaintiff, 
Voest-Alpine Trading Corporation, of an order of 1000 metric tons of 
styrene monomer to the Jiangyin Foreign Trade Corporation, located in 
Jiangyin City, Jiangsu Province, China.209  The Fifth Circuit looked to 
whether the act on which the suit for payment was based caused an “effect 
in the United States” that was an “immediate consequence” of the 
defendant’s activity.210  Affirming the district court’s conclusion that the 
suit was proper according to FSIA’s direct effect provision, it held that the 
defendant’s failure to pay on the letter of credit caused, as an immediate 
and direct consequence, an American corporation to suffer a nontrivial 
financial loss.211  The court, therefore, relied on precedent holding that 
financial loss in the United States by an American plaintiff was sufficient 
under the direct effect provision, which it further noted was entirely 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Weltover.212 
The court could find nothing in the text to support the Second 
Circuit’s legally significant act test.  Thus, the court concluded that the use 
of the test would add a requirement without a textual basis to FSIA.213 
Perhaps much more significant, however, was the Fifth Circuit’s concern 
that the legally significant act test merges the second clause of the 
 
 206.  See infra note 218. 
 207.  See, e.g., Westfield v. Fed. Republic of Ger., 633 F.3d 409, 414–15 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(concluding that there are no objective standards to guide the interpretation of the direct effect 
provision, only factual comparisons). 
 208.  142 F.3d 887, 895 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 209.  Id. at 890–91. 
 210.  Id. at 892–93. 
 211.  Id. at 892–93, 897. 
 212.  Id. at 893 (citing Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1111–12 (5th Cir. 1985)). 
 213.  Id. at 894.  The court noted that the Supreme Court in Weltover had already reprimanded 
lower courts for adding requirements without textual bases to FSIA when it rejected their reading into 
the statute a requirement that the effect be substantial and foreseeable.  Id. (quoting Republic of Arg. v. 
Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992)). 
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commercial activity exception in FSIA with the direct effect provision.214  
The second clause requires that an act occurring in the United States serve 
as a basis for the action.215  Therefore, the legally significant act sought by 
the Second Circuit under the third clause could quite arguably be the same 
as that found under the second, “except . . . that the third clause would also 
require proof of an act outside the United States upon which the action is 
also based” and that had  caused a direct effect in the United States.216  
Whether this is precisely accurate in every case, it does come dangerously 
close to rendering the third clause rather “meaningless.”217 
For the Fifth Circuit, the failure of payment was a financial loss, but 
for the Second Circuit it was an omission of performance.  One formulation 
treats the transaction as property that is lost, and the other treats the 
transaction as a series of legally significant events, the final one of which 
occurs in the United States.  It is debatable whether it would be more 
faithful to the word “effect” to consider such failure as a loss (for clearly a 
loss was suffered in both cases) or as a failure of performance, which also 
occurred in both cases. 
Several years after Voest-Alpine, and despite endorsements of the 
legally significant act test from the Ninth and Tenth Circuits,218 the Sixth 
Circuit also rejected the test in the case of Keller v. Central Bank of 
Nigeria.219  Like the Fifth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit concluded that adding 
requirements to the statute would be improper, given the Supreme Court’s 
admonishment in Weltover.220 
These condemnations notwithstanding, the legally significant act test 
has persisted and was reaffirmed and re-explained in the recent Second 
Circuit case of Guirlando v. T.C. Bankasi A.S.221  Guirlando has a set of 
sympathetic facts, which, like many of the overseas tort cases, creates the 
desire to extend the extraterritorial reach of the direct effect provision.  
Unfortunately the court failed to see the logic of doing so. 
In Guirlando, the plaintiff, Ms. Guirlando, met and married a man 
 
 214.  Id. at 895. 
 215.  Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994)). 
 216.  Id. at 895–97. 
 217.  Id. at 895. 
 218.  Adler v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 107 F.3d 720, 727 (9th Cir. 1997); United World Trade, 
Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Prod. Ass’n, 33 F.3d 1232, 1239 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 219.  277 F.3d 811, 818 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 220.  Id. (citing Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China, 142 F.3d 887, 895 (5th Cir. 
1998)). 
 221.  602 F.3d 69, 73–74 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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(Cicek) of Turkish descent in New York.222  Shortly following their 
marriage, Cicek disappeared without notice but telephoned Guirlando from 
abroad to say that the U.S. government had deported him to Turkey.223  
Guirlando sold her house and car and, at Cicek’s invitation, flew to Turkey 
to join him.224  Once in Turkey, she deposited the funds from the sale of her 
property, drawn from a check from Citibank’s New York branch, into an 
account with the defendant bank, Ziraat, which the parties conceded 
qualified as an instrumentality of the Turkish government under FSIA.225  
Guirlando alleged that Ziraat’s employees failed to inform her of her option 
to open an account in her own name or, in the alternative, a joint account 
that only permitted withdrawals with the consent of both parties.226  
Instead, she opened a joint account with Cicek that permitted withdrawals 
by either party without the other’s consent.227  Cicek removed and robbed 
her of the bulk of the money of the account, leaving her with approximately 
20 percent of her life savings.228  After discovering the fraud, Guirlando 
returned to the United States and lived in drastically reduced 
circumstances.229  She alleged in her complaint that Ziraat’s employees 
knew that Cicek was already married when he married Guirlando and that 
he had been cheating on her, and she further averred that Ziraat’s 
employees had engaged in negligence, negligent misrepresentation, 
breaches of a contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing, and a breach 
of fiduciary duty.230 
Presumably unable to prove that Ziraat had been conspiring with 
Cicek since her marriage in New York, Guirlando sought jurisdiction over 
Ziraat under FSIA’s direct effect provision.231  She made two principal 
arguments: first, that the defendant’s actions had caused an effect “in the 
United States” by causing money to be transferred from a bank in New 
York to a bank in Turkey; and second, that the defendant’s actions had 
caused a loss to her in the United States because her standard of living had 
declined significantly.232 
 
 222.  Id. at 72. 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  Id. at 73. 
 226.  Id. at 72. 
 227.  Id. 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  Id. 
 230.  Id. at 72–73. 
 231.  Id. 
 232.  Id. at 73. 
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The Second Circuit affirmed the importance of the legally significant 
act test, with some clarification as to its application.233  The court noted that 
the legally significant act test does not conflate the second and third 
clauses, as the Fifth Circuit had suggested, because the test does not require 
the performance of an act in the United States.234  The court explained that 
the requirement of an act that is legally significant includes the effect or 
result itself, which may be an omission.235  Therefore, for example, when 
payment is required to be made to a U.S. corporation at a U.S. bank, the 
legally significant act is the omission or the failure of payment there, and 
the act abroad that is legally significant is the defendant’s decision not to 
pay. 
With this re-formulation in mind, the court dismissed Guirlando’s 
arguments.236  It rejected her loss argument on the grounds that the loss 
occurred in Turkey, where the swindle took place, and any financial loss 
that Guirlando felt was not a direct effect of that behavior.237  There was, 
therefore, no legally significant act in the United States and thus no loss in 
the United States.  The second argument similarly failed because the 
wrongdoing that Guirlando alleged—Ziraat’s statements regarding 
potential bank accounts and its notification to Guirlando’s husband of the 
transfer from New York—had not caused her to transfer her money from a 
U.S. bank to a Turkish bank.238  The court concluded that Guirlando had 
intended to open an account with the defendant when she walked into the 
defendant’s branch and that the defendant’s subsequent actions had had no 
bearing on that.239 
The Guirlando decision is problematic on several levels.  First, it 
rendered the legally significant act test even less user-friendly than it had 
been previously.  The court now requires that the lower courts not look 
literally to an act performed in the United States but rather to an act in the 
sense of a result, including, but not limited to, an omission or a failure of 
payment or performance.  Under the classic paradigm in which a contract 
calls for payment in the United States, this formulation would surely be 
workable, but how applicable is it to other, more complex circumstances 
that might arise?  In addition, in its analysis of the plaintiff’s claims, the 
court used the phrase “legal significance” in a confusing way.  It seemed to 
 
 233.  Id. at 75–76. 
 234.  Id. at 76. 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  Id. at 79–82. 
 237.  Id. at 79–80. 
 238.  Id. at 80. 
 239.  Id. at 81. 
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conflate the legal significance of the effect in the United States with the 
requirement from the Supreme Court’s decision in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 
decided under the first clause of the commercial activities exception, that 
the commercial activity within the United States form the constituent 
elements of a plaintiff’s claim.240  This misses the mark of what FSIA 
textually requires. 
There is no requirement that the claim under the commercial activities 
exception arise out of the direct effect.  Rather, the claim must be based on 
a foreign act in connection with a foreign commercial activity.  This 
language differs markedly from the FTAIA, which provides that the 
“effect” on U.S. commerce must “give[] rise” to the plaintiff’s claim under 
the Sherman Act.241  In Guirlando, Guirlando and Ziraat entered into a 
transaction.  Ziraat was to deliver an account under certain terms of use and 
service, and Guirlando was to deliver funds into that account.242  The 
elements of Guirlando’s claims of negligent misrepresentation and breach 
of fiduciary duty come from the events involved in this transaction and are 
thus based upon it.  Had Ziraat not, as Guirlando alleged, misrepresented 
certain material terms243—a merits, rather than jurisdictional, question—
then the transaction would have happened quite differently or perhaps not 
at all.  The effect in the United States was therefore that funds were 
removed from the country, or rather were drawn on a New York bank, as 
part of the plaintiff’s performance, which occurred under a false 
apprehension of the terms of the deal.  For the Second Circuit to decide 
otherwise is to be unfaithful to its analysis in Weltover, in which it divided 
up the components of a transaction (negotiations, contract, performance) 
and then analyzed whether any of the events associated with these 
components caused some non-de minimis result in the United States. 
The Fifth Circuit’s test, focusing merely on directness and some effect 
in the United States, would have functioned in the same way, if not better, 
in Guirlando, essentially demonstrating the superfluity of the legally 
significant act test.  This test would have allowed the Second Circuit to 
reject Guirlando’s argument that Ziraat’s actions caused her to return to the 
United States, having lost most of her life savings.244  The immediate 
consequence of Ziraat’s actions, at best, was the loss of Guirlando’s 
savings in Turkey.245  The fact that Guirlando then returned to the United 
 
 240.  507 U.S. 349, 357 (1993). 
 241.  15 U.S.C. § 6a(2) (2012). 
 242.  Guirlando, 602 F.3d at 72. 
 243.  Id. 
 244.  Id. 
 245.  Id. 
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States is too attenuated an event, both in terms of time and causation, to 
have been directly felt in the United States.246  Guirlando’s volitional act of 
returning to the United States disrupts the chain of causation needed to 
qualify Ziraat’s act as a direct cause of that final circumstance.247 
More importantly, the Fifth Circuit’s test would have also permitted 
the correct result on Guirlando’s argument that a direct effect of Ziraat’s 
actions was felt in the United States when her life savings was drawn from 
a U.S. bank.  In that respect, the withdrawal of the money from a New 
York account was a direct and immediate consequence of the commercial 
activity, or the deal to open an account, between Guirlando and Ziraat.  
Consider the steps in the transaction: (1) a deal was reached, (2) Guirlando 
performed by allowing Ziraat to draw funds from her account in the United 
States, and (3) Ziraat’s withdrawal caused a transfer of property from the 
United States.  This was not merely one leg of a complex transaction, in 
which money went through several banks, but was rather the primary act of 
performance on Guirlando’s part in her deal with Ziraat. 
The Fifth Circuit’s test has the distinct advantage of focusing on only 
the words in the statute: “direct effect in the United States.”248  In stark 
contrast, the Second Circuit’s approach, post-Guirlando, requires a court to 
examine the differences between the words “effect,” “act,” and “omission”; 
apply the conclusion of this examination to the facts; and then ascribe some 
sort of legal significance to the result of that analysis.  This test is, in short, 
a metaphysical mess.  A serious problem with the Second Circuit’s 
approach is, therefore, that it is difficult to apply and likely to produce 
disparate results that draw the reach of FSIA litigation rather narrowly.  
Additionally, neither the words “act” and “omission” nor the legal 
significance inquiry that follows find any basis in the text of the statute!  
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Morrison made an “affirmative 
indication” of congressional intent the core of the extraterritoriality 
equation.249  This framework, along with Weltover’s holding, makes the 
Second Circuit’s legally significant act test highly questionable.250 
It is also notable that, in Frontera Resources Azerbaijan Corp. v. State 
 
 246.  Id. 
 247.  Id. 
 248.  Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China, 142 F.3d 887, 893 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 249.  130 S. Ct. at 2883. 
 250.  The legally significant act test represents the same approach to interpretation that the Second 
Circuit used prior to Morrison for statutes that are silent on extraterritoriality.  For example, the Circuit 
read into the Securities Exchange Act an intent to reach transactions that affect U.S. markets.  Morrison 
v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2008).  At the same time, the test arguably adds 
territorial limits where Congress may not have meant to apply them. 
BALZANO MACRO CLEAN(DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2014  12:32 PM 
2013] DIRECT EFFECT JURISDICTION UNDER THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT 39 
Oil Co. of the Azerbaijan Republic, the Second Circuit ultimately agreed 
with the doubt that the Supreme Court cast in Weltover251 on the 
personhood of a foreign state under the due process clause.252  In Frontera, 
the Second Circuit overruled its holding in Texas Trading that foreign 
states were entitled to due process.253  The plaintiffs had obtained an 
arbitral award against a state-owned enterprise of Azerbaijan.254  Seeking to 
enforce the award, the district court had inquired into whether it had quasi 
in rem or personal jurisdiction and had concluded that the defendant had 
pointed to no property that would support the former and had insufficient 
minimum contacts for the court to exercise the latter.255  Not quibbling with 
the quasi in rem holding, the Second Circuit followed fairly recent 
precedent of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, holding that, if the states, which are part of the union 
that is the United States, could not “avail” themselves of the protections of 
the due process clause as “persons” within its reach, then there was no 
reason to conclude that foreign sovereigns, which are wholly outside the 
Union, could do so.256  That holding, however, only applies to foreign 
states and not necessarily to their instrumentalities.257  It was immaterial 
that FSIA actually defines state-owned enterprises as a foreign state—i.e., 
as part of a whole —because that should not influence the Constitution’s 
conception of the constituent parts of the foreign state.  The court also held 
that if an instrumentality is essentially the alter ego (or closely controlled 
agent) of the foreign state or its separateness is a fiction utilized to 
perpetrate a fraud, the instrumentality could stand in the shoes of the 
foreign state and lose due process protection.258  The court did not 
ultimately resolve the status of a juridically distinct foreign instrumentality 
under the due process clause because it was as yet unclear if the defendant 
 
 251.  In a recent case, the Supreme Court described personal jurisdiction under the statutory 
provisions of FSIA as “automatic,” thus continuing the doubt as to whether due process should apply.  
Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2292 n.20 (2010). 
 252.  582 F.3d 393, 398–401 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 253.  Id. at 400. 
 254.  Id. at 395. 
 255.  Id. 
 256.  Id. at 399 (quoting Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 97 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002). 
 257.  Id. at 400. 
 258.  Id.  The Second Circuit thus joined the debate amongst the circuits post-Weltover as to 
whether and under what circumstances a foreign state is entitled to due process protections.  See, e.g., 
BP Chemicals Ltd. v. Jiangsu SOPO Corp., 420 F.3d 810, 818 (8th Cir. 2005) (concluding that the 
nexus required for commercial activity is sufficient for minimum contacts such that a foreign sovereign 
would be expected to be haled into court in the United States). 
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entity was the alter ego of the foreign state.259  The court held that it would 
be premature to analyze due process’s applicability to juridically distinct 
instrumentalities without first resolving that factual question.260 
IV. RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF FSIA’S PRESCRIPTIVE REACH 
AND A PROPOSAL FOR INTEGRATION 
On the basis of the discussion above, three propositions should be 
evident: first, the glosses on the minimum contacts standard, such as the 
“legally significant act test,” are unworkable and confusing.  Second, 
because FSIA is a federal statute with many state law characteristics, the 
dilemma in the FSIA direct effect provision context is similar, although not 
identical, to that faced in the extraterritorial state law context that Professor 
Florey describes: how to insert some measure of comity concerns into the 
analysis in order to avoid overreaching applications of U.S. law in foreign 
nations and disturbance of harmony in the international order, i.e., relations 
and cooperation between nations.  Third, FSIA is a statute that strikes at the 
heart of the foreign relations concerns that now color the Supreme Court’s 
extraterritoriality analysis because it implicates sovereignty on a higher 
level than a normal dispute with a private player would.  In light of these 
three propositions, courts should endeavor to integrate the concerns raised 
in other cases that relate to extraterritorial application of U.S. law into the 
FSIA context.  Why integrate?  Because it will create an intellectually 
honest, multi-factored analysis that leads to more consistent and fairer 
results and because it will help to separate the analysis from other heavily 
unsettled areas of the law. 
In the direct effect provision, Congress has tied subject matter 
jurisdiction, immunity, and related issues of personal jurisdiction and 
choice of law together.  Therefore, in discussing this proposal, it is perhaps 
best to break the following discussion into separate questions that courts 
should ask.  First, did Congress intend to prescribe, and what are the 
implications of prescribing, federal immunity standards to X conduct 
detached to Y degree from the United States?  And, second, what are the 
implications of applying substantive state or federal law to the merits and 
thereby regulating the conduct to an even further degree?  Both questions 
implicate U.S. regulation of conduct that foreign sovereigns might 
otherwise not regulate or regulate differently.  This section will further 
argue that personal jurisdiction and its constituent due process prong 
should be a separate question from the prescriptive jurisdiction 
 
 259.  Frontera Res. Azer. Corp., 582 F.3d at 400. 
 260.  Id. 
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determination. 
A. Prescription of Foreign Conduct by U.S. Federal Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity Standards 
Regardless of the specific formulation that a court utilizes, this inquiry 
should involve statutory interpretation via questions of textual and 
contextual statutory analysis and non-precedential canons, consideration of 
discernible international law, and analysis of international comity concerns.  
Courts should acknowledge this task for the diverse and mixed inquiry that 
it is to avoid the substantial confusion that is evident in the decisions 
described above. 
The inquiry into congressional intent should examine FSIA’s text, 
structure, legislative history, and purposes.261  As noted above, the text is 
susceptible to both broad and narrow readings.  The legislative history 
gives some clue that international principles and the limits of adjudicative 
jurisdiction under the due process clause may be guides as to FSIA’s 
appropriate reach.262  Furthermore, the focus of the direct effect provision 
under Morrison is almost entirely on acts abroad.263 
In analyzing the text within FSIA’s overall structure, a court may also 
consider the expansiveness of the extraterritorial application of other 
exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.  For example, the arbitration 
exception requires virtually no connection with the United States to engage 
federal court process,264 and the terrorism exception requires that the 
plaintiff had been an American citizen at the time that state-sponsored 
terrorism injured him or her, employing the passive personality basis for 
jurisdiction under international law.265  The latter exception shows that 
FSIA was meant to apply more broadly than international standards, and so 
perhaps the direct effect provision should be similarly applied, considering 
 
 261.  See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2290–93 (2010) (explicitly and implicitly 
approving all of these methods). 
 262.  At least one scholar has warned of the dangers of ardent textualism in interpreting a statute as 
complex and poorly drafted as FSIA.  Joseph Dellapenna, Interpreting the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act: Reading or Construing the Text, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 555, 557–70 (2011).  
FSIA has a rich legislative history containing a number of stated purposes and policies served by its 
enactment and a section-by-section analysis of the original text, including the direct effect provision, in 
the House Report.  Id. at 559–70. 
 263.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012). 
 264.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6) (only requiring that the agreement to arbitrate or the claim be 
essentially compatible with the laws and treaties of the United States, regardless of whether it has a U.S. 
territorial nexus). 
 265.  28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2012). 
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its unqualified language.266  Furthermore, the other clauses in the 
commercial activities exception are more defined.  FSIA’s definition 
section states that the phrase “commercial activity carried on in the United 
States” refers to conduct that has “substantial contact” with the United 
States.267  Should the direct effect provision be read in line with this 
“substantial contact” command, considering the sheer logic of such an 
approach?  Or is the direct effect provision’s exclusion from the more 
circumscribed definition a deliberate and, therefore, material act by 
Congress?  FSIA’s text bends the reader in various directions, often 
demanding the consideration of other contexts to break the tie. 
Given the aforementioned Supreme Court precedent in this area, 
canons of interpretation should play a significant role, when applicable.  
First, despite the fact that the strength accorded to the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is not quite yet determined,268 such a canon may prove 
useful as a tie-breaker in ambiguous cases because it means that a court 
should pull back when it is unsure and because it reminds the court that the 
touchstone of prescriptive jurisdiction is still, albeit more loosely, territory.  
Similarly, although not controlling over the inquiry into congressional 
intent, courts should determine whether the action is consistent with 
jurisdictional bases under international law.  Again, when ambiguous, 
Congress should be presumed to have legislated within the bounds of 
international law.269  FSIA was meant to codify international law and 
should not be interpreted, if possible, in a way that directly contravenes 
it.270 
 
 266.  Keith E. Sealing, State Sponsors of Terrorism are Entitled to Due Process Too: The Amended 
Sovereign Immunities Act is Unconstitutional, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 395, 454–55 (2000) (discussing 
seemingly constitutional and international law problems with the terrorism exception). 
 267.  28 U.S.C. § 1603(e) (2012) (defining the relevant phrase); 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (containing 
the defined phrase). 
 268.  Unlike in Morrison, it is clear that the FSIA was  meant to apply extraterritorially. 
 269.  Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
 270.  See Permanent Mission of India to the UN v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193, 199 (2007) 
(“Our reading of the text is supported by two well-recognized and related purposes of the FSIA: 
adoption of the restrictive view of sovereign immunity and codification of international law at the time 
of the FSIA’s enactment.”).  Indeed, international, as opposed to domestic, standards are applied under 
FSIA for purposes of determining the judicial distinctness of entities of foreign states and agency 
issues.  See Sachs v. Republic of Austria, 695 F.3d 1021, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc 
granted, 705 F.3d 1112 (2013) (citing First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de 
Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983)) (adopting a standard that was previously articulated based on general 
international principles to determine whether a U.S. ticket agent could be held to be the agent of an 
Austrian rail company to provide for jurisdiction under the FSIA’s commercial activities exception for 
commercial activity carried on in the United States); see also Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. La 
República de Venez., 200 F.3d 843, 847–48 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Arriba Ltd. v. Petróleos Mexicanos, 962 
F.2d 528, 533–36 (5th Cir. 1992). 
BALZANO MACRO CLEAN(DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2014  12:32 PM 
2013] DIRECT EFFECT JURISDICTION UNDER THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT 43 
There is ample other authority that may be useful in discerning the 
bounds of international law, including the practice of other common law 
nations, such as the United Kingdom, Singapore, Canada, and Australia, 
which have their own state immunity acts.271  Even where a comparison 
with another common law jurisdiction that has a comprehensive foreign 
sovereign immunity statute is not possible, most jurisdictions have 
embraced a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity (like FSIA) and so 
would have helpful cases to examine.272  Moreover, comparisons to the 
practices of other national jurisdictions are not uncommonly found in 
Supreme Court opinions.273  Commentators have argued that citation to 
foreign precedent has been a pillar of the development of U.S. law.274  
Thus, examining state practice in addition to, or in the context of, the 
Restatement’s formulations will lend a useful dimension to this debate. 
Courts will need to analyze the forum’s interest in, or rather 
connections to, the suit as part of the Supreme Court’s comity or 
reasonableness test.275  In so doing, courts should analyze prescriptive and 
personal jurisdiction separately.  This has the advantage of avoiding 
procedural difficulties such as those that occurred in the Rein case, in 
which personal and subject matter jurisdiction were conflated and 
complicated interlocutory review.  The Court has, moreover, concluded 
that prescriptive jurisdiction should be considered separately from 
adjudicative jurisdiction.  Echoing his dissent in Hartford Fire, Justice 
 
 271. Foreign State Immunities Act 1985 (Cth) pt 1, s 3 (Austl.); State Immunity Act, R.S.C. 1985, 
c. S-18 (Can.); State Immunity Act, pt. II, § 19(2) (rev. ed. 1985) (Sing.).  The issue of the precise role 
and ascertainment of international law relates to larger debates that no FSIA case can solve.  For 
example, as Professor Coangelo asks, should the relevance of international law be different depending 
on whether the cause of action is meant to implement international law?  And what is the proper place 
of customary international law vis-à-vis federal common law in this equation?  Coangelo, supra note 
119, at 1032.  The resolution of these debates is beyond the scope here; suffice it to say that 
international law, if substantial authority is available, should be at least one strong factor in the court’s 
analysis of congressional intent and any additional discretionary considerations. 
 272.  See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Philip B. Perlman, 
Acting Attorney Gen. (May 19, 1952), Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign 
Immunity to Foreign Governments, 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984, 985 (noting all of the jurisdictions, even 
then, that had begun to embrace restrictive immunity as the standard).  Even more jurisdictions have 
recently come around to this standard.  See, e.g., HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 461 (3rd ed. 2009) 
(noting that in 2006 the Japanese Supreme Court changed its position on foreign sovereign immunity 
from an absolute to a restrictive standard). 
 273.  It is not unusual for courts to cite the law of other states in their decisions to support 
assertions of what constitutes internationally agreed upon practice.  Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, 
The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131, 135–36 (2006). 
 274.  Steven G. Calabresi, “A Shining City on a Hill”: American Exceptionalism and the Supreme 
Court’s Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1335, 1341 (2006). 
 275.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403 (1987) (setting forth factors 
articulating the interest of the state and informing the jurisdictional reasonableness analysis). 
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Scalia made clear in the majority opinion in Morrison that subject matter 
jurisdiction and prescriptive jurisdiction are also conceptually distinct.276  
The Court previously made a similar distinction between the contacts 
necessary for jurisdiction and those necessary for choice of law.277  
Although the Court has not made it abundantly apparent why, in its 
opinion, these distinctions are valuable, the differences between these 
concepts and their implications and policy advantages are discernible.278 
For example, despite the fact that due process’s “fairness and 
substantial justice” prong integrates some measure of foreign relations-
related concerns into the personal jurisdiction inquiry,279 the overall due 
process analysis under personal jurisdiction is a mandatory constitutional 
question that is distinct from the more loosely defined and applied comity 
concerns that have animated the prescriptive jurisdiction inquiry.280  
Indeed, this is reflective of the recognized premise in jurisprudence that 
foreign states interact through a dynamic and flexible diplomatic 
framework and not through constitutionally protected relationships.281  
Whether personal jurisdiction is proper is primarily a question meant to 
protect the individual liberty of litigants.  Put differently, personal 
jurisdiction is concerned with whether courts may fairly exercise power 
over the person or entity.  Similarly, subject matter jurisdiction is a 
mandatory constitutional question regarding the court’s power over the 
substance of a dispute, e.g., federal question or diverse litigants.282  In 
contrast, prescriptive jurisdiction concerns whether the statute reaches the 
foreign conduct at issue, given any comity concerns that should apply.283  
In reality, the prescriptive jurisdictional analysis is primarily concerned 
 
 276.  Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2876–77 (2010). 
 277.  See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 317 n.23 (1981) (“[E]xamination of a 
State’s contacts may result in divergent conclusions for jurisdiction and choice-of-law purposes.”). 
 278.  The extent to which this separation is possible in a statute like FSIA where the existence of 
personal and subject matter jurisdiction are statutorily interwoven may be different than in other 
contexts.  It may be that, because of the way that 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) is written, after the court has 
determined whether Congress intended FSIA to prescribe such conduct, it will fairly automatically have 
subject matter jurisdiction, which depends upon meeting the requirements of one of FSIA’s exceptions.  
This may be so unless there is a problem with other elements of the commercial activities exception, 
such as the action not being based upon the activity that causes the direct effect, as 28 U.S.C. § 
1605(a)(2) requires. 
 279.  Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 107, 115 (1987) 
(federal interest in “foreign relations policies” best served by an inquiry into the reasonableness of 
jurisdiction). 
 280.  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945). 
 281.  Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 202 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 282. See, e.g., Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884) (holding 
that a court is obliged to consider questions of federal subject matter jurisdiction whenever they arise). 
 283.  See supra Section II.B. 
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with whether something is, or should be, limited by U.S. law, not with 
whether an organ of government has the power to limit it. 
Equating the prescriptive inquiry to the personal jurisdiction inquiry is 
not functional in some circumstances.  Suppose that a defendant appears 
voluntarily before the court and defends the suit.  The issue of personal 
jurisdiction is waived, but the questions of whether Congress intended for 
the conduct at issue to be regulated by a decision in federal court and 
whether it should be so regulated remain unresolved.284  In addition, in 
some matters involving foreign conduct, a court may obtain personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant through contacts unrelated to the substance of 
the suit.285  And, for some entities of a foreign state, satisfaction of due 
process may not be required at all.286  Furthermore, even the application of 
foreign law to the merits of a case, reducing the concern over legal 
conflicts other than the immunity question itself, does not necessarily 
diminish the court’s interest in asserting power over the parties.287  Finally, 
FSIA requirements regarding necessary forum contacts to the commercial 
activities underlying the claim, issues of agency, and abuses of the 
corporate form may also be incompatible with their analogs under personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence. 
In both personal and prescriptive jurisdiction inquiries, it is important 
to recognize the distinction between safeguarding the fairness guarantees 
embodied in notions of procedural due process to litigants and ensuring 
fairness to other sovereigns, whose interests in regulating the conduct at 
issue can be seriously injured by foreign courts applying more stringent 
standards than those in the sovereigns’ domestic law.  Justice Stevens has 
made this conceptual distinction between the due process clause inquiry for 
choice of law and the Full Faith and Credit clause inquiry.288  The former 
protects litigants from unfair surprise, while the latter maintains national 
 
 284.  There is also authority suggesting that the contacts necessary for personal jurisdiction are not 
always sufficient for the territorial nexus required for a claim under the commercial activity exception.  
See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 378–79 (1993) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (opining with respect 
to the presence of a nexus under FSIA that “[i]f the same activities had been performed by a private 
business, I have no doubt jurisdiction would be upheld”). 
 285.  See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 98–99 (2d Cir. 2000) (general 
jurisdiction available); see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1677–78 (2013) 
(Breyer, J. concurring) (noting same). 
 286.  See supra notes 256–57 and accompanying text. 
 287.  Benton v. Cameco Corp., 375 F.3d 1070, 1084 (10th Cir. 2004) (Holloway, J., dissenting) 
(noting that a state’s interest in providing a forum to adjudicate injuries to its citizens by foreign 
corporations is separate from the interest it may have in whether its law is applied in resolving a 
dispute). 
 288.  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320–23 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
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unity by avoiding state-to-state conflicts.289  Although these balances are 
relevant to both personal and prescriptive jurisdiction, the latter balance of 
harmony and order amongst sovereigns weighs more heavily in the 
prescriptive jurisdiction context.  For example, in the antitrust cases above, 
the Court seems to place more emphasis on fairness vis-à-vis sovereigns 
than it does on fairness vis-à-vis corporate defendants.290 
Therefore, based on the above distinctions, the prescriptive 
jurisdiction inquiry will, as it has with antitrust and securities law, allow 
courts to conduct a multifaceted analysis of the extraterritorial sweep of the 
direct effect provision.291  A court can balance concerns about regulating 
behavior, or the effects of behavior, in the United States with concerns 
about the intrusion into the regulatory sphere of another sovereign,292 
including the sovereign’s immunity from suit in its own jurisdiction.293  
This issue leaves a court to ask: Does the suit touch upon such sensitive 
foreign relations issues that it would be tantamount to a political 
question?294  Would the sovereign be subject to a similar suit in its own 
jurisdiction?  Does the suit create an irreconcilable policy conflict?  If so, 
how important is that policy and to whom? 
The use of this multifaceted analysis does not suggest that the reading 
 
 289.  Id. 
 290.  See, e.g., F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 163–65 (2004) 
(focusing on the comity amongst sovereigns as opposed to the adverse effects on consumers inside and 
outside the United States resulting from anti-competitive behavior).. 
 291.  In Hartford Fire, Justice Scalia viewed comity as a limiting principle that courts should 
assume Congress has incorporated, not a doctrine of judicial abstention.  Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
California, 509 U.S. 764, 818 n.9 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  This analysis offers more form than 
substance because of how flexible and open to interpretation the test for comity is. 
 292.  It is beyond the scope of this Article to say what deference, if any, in the FSIA context should 
be given to the judgment of the State Department.  See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 
(2004) (discussing the role of executive in determinations of immunity).  It should suffice for purposes 
here to say that any “suggestion” by the executive through the Department of State about the influence 
of the decision on the foreign affairs of the United States should be entitled to consideration in the 
basket of comity and comity-related concerns that a court may use to determine the proper reach of the 
direct effect provision of FSIA.  Other courts have held that executive judgment is entitled to a 
substantial degree of deference, although not conclusive deference.  Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 
773 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The State Department’s determination regarding conduct-based immunity . . . is 
not controlling but it carries substantial weight in our analysis of the issue.”). 
 293.  Courts have long considered whether a sovereign would be immune in its jurisdiction when 
considering whether to apply foreign sovereign immunity standards.  See, e.g., The Pesaro, 277 F. 473, 
483 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (“But the fact that the steamship Pesaro itself is subject to the ordinary process of 
the Italian court would seem to be vital and decisive.  There is no reason of international comity or 
courtesy which requires that Italian property not deemed extra commercium in Italy should be treated as 
res publica and extra commercium in the United States.”). 
 294.  See Balzano, supra note 28, at 108–09 (2011) (arguing that courts should determine whether 
or not they should decline to adjudicate a case based upon the standards in the political question 
doctrine rather than mechanically listening to the opinions of the other branches regarding avoidance). 
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of FSIA’s direct effect provision need necessarily be any narrower than it is 
currently; indeed, it may actually be read more expansively by courts.  This 
increased breadth is probably appropriate in many cases.  For example, it is 
difficult to discern any unreasonable interference with foreign affairs in the 
Guirlando case.  The United States clearly had a strong interest in 
protecting against serious financial injury to its citizens by alleged 
collusive fraud abroad.  It is difficult to locate any significant foreign 
relations concern that would have counseled against an ordinary 
commercial suit against a Turkish bank, especially when the allegations 
were of fraudulent conduct that nations universally condemn.  Efficiency 
concerns, i.e., those best reserved for a forum non conveniens motion, may 
ultimately dictate that the suit be brought elsewhere, of course.  Moreover, 
this case illustrates the difference that exists between commercial litigation 
and antitrust and securities cases, which arguably strike more at the heart of 
a government’s targeted efforts to regulate the economy than do tort or 
contract disputes.295  Indeed, if every tort or contract dispute requires 
serious consideration of foreign relations, then the future development of 
the global economy may be in trouble. 
The fact that FSIA cases deal with a foreign sovereign further alters 
the calculation.  Somehow the lower courts seem to have lost track of the 
fact that, as the Supreme Court acknowledged in Verlinden B.V. v. Central 
Bank of Nigeria, Congress never restricted the class of plaintiffs in an FSIA 
suit.296  It left open the possibility that foreign plaintiffs could bring a claim 
against a foreign sovereign in a U.S. court, provided that some connection 
with the United States, such as those in the commercial activity exception, 
exists.  Allowing such a broad class of claims to come before U.S. courts 
exhibits a congressional intent that the statute should sweep broadly, not 
looking to whether foreign sovereigns have purposefully directed their 
conduct at the United States but rather at whether their foreign commercial 
activity, potentially with a non-U.S. party, has resulted in some direct effect 
in the United States. 
Foreign sovereigns are also in a much different position than are 
private companies.  Courts must view this policy issue in the context of 
 
 295.  The Pesaro, 277 F. at 485 (“[I]t seems improbable that in these days the judicial seizure of a 
publicly owned merchantman like the Pesaro would affect our foreign relations in any greater degree 
than the judicial seizure of a great privately owned merchantman like the Aquitania.  Indeed, it would 
seem that foreign relations are much less likely to be disturbed if the rights and obligations of foreign 
states growing out of their ordinary civil transactions were dealt with by the established rules of law, 
than if they were made a matter of diplomatic concern.”); see also Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. 
World Airways, 568 F. Supp. 811, 817 (D.D.C. 1983) (referring to the Sherman Act as “our charter of 
economic liberty”). 
 296.  461 U.S. 480, 490 (1983). 
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FSIA.  Foreign sovereigns possess greater contacts with the world—indeed, 
likely a branch (or embassy) in every country with which they have 
relations.  The possibility of sovereign bankruptcy is also questionable 
because there are no internationally-accepted rules for such an 
event.297  Moreover, unlike private companies, foreign sovereigns possess 
coercive powers, which have broad implications for the way in which the 
sovereigns are treated.  Even if they are acting in a private capacity, 
therefore, they have a unique advantage.  Because of this, it may be that in 
many cases, to ensure that private parties are not disadvantaged by dealing 
with an entity connected with a foreign state, it is fair to extend jurisdiction 
and law to foreign sovereigns in their private actions to a greater extent 
than is fair for private corporations.298 
In contrast, an argument exists for narrower jurisdiction against 
foreign sovereigns, not simply because of vague foreign relations concerns 
but also because the sovereigns’ resources should be preserved for the 
benefit of the sovereigns’ citizens.299  This argument may have less force in 
the FSIA context because the statute allows for execution and attachment 
only if the property is in the United States and has relevance to commercial 
activity, mitigating concerns over the entanglement of sovereign 
property.300  The statute also maintains heightened protections for military 
and central bank property.301  These issues will provide background 
“context” as courts analyze FSIA’s reach. 
B. Prescription of Foreign Conduct by Federal or State Law 
Aside from the substantive standards of foreign sovereign immunity, a 
court’s analysis of the direct effect provision may be affected by the law 
that will ultimately apply to the merits.  Although this is surely one of the 
foreign relations-related concerns, perhaps more needs to be said on how 
much weight a court should give this factor.  While FSIA applies a 
universal federal standard to questions of immunity, it contains no bar 
 
 297.  Ross Buckley, A Tale of Two Crises: The Search for the Enduring Reforms of the 
International Financial System, 6 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 14 (2001) (noting the famous 
comment by the CEO of Citicorp Walter Wriston that “[c]ountries never go bankrupt,” which has now 
become synonymous with a theory by the same name). 
 298.  See id. (noting that private investors can certainly go bankrupt lending to foreign sovereign 
borrowers). 
 299.  Cf. Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, 920 F. Supp.2d 517, 532–33 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that, 
despite quasi-sovereign interest in the health and welfare of its people, Iraq has no standing to pursue 
those interests in U.S. court parens patriae). 
 300.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1609–1610 (2012). 
 301.  28 U.S.C. § 1611 (2012). 
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against the application of foreign law to the merits of the case.302  There is a 
split of authority amongst the circuits as to whether FSIA’s text and 
structure support the use of the state forum’s or federal common law’s 
choice of law rules.303  In some cases, however, the distinction will be 
meaningless as both the state and federal common law will apply the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.304  And, in all cases, the choice 
of law rules may point to the application of the law of a foreign nation.  
Therefore, in a close case, how much does the fact that FSIA’s structure 
will permit Arizona contract law to govern the dispute matter to whether 
the direct effect provision will apply?  In other words, would the 
application of Arizona law create a conflict between its requirements or 
standards and those of the foreign country defendant’s law?  In other 
contexts this seems of paramount importance.  After all, it is this regulatory 
conflict rule that prevents a literal operation of the effects provision in the 
Sherman Act via the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act and 
prompts courts to exercise restraint. 
In the case of FSIA, although the law that will ultimately govern the 
merits should be a factor in the court’s reasoning, it is cleaner to rest upon 
the FSIA’s denial of immunity and permission of jurisdiction as sufficient 
evidence of legislative intent that U.S. immunity law may prescribe foreign 
conduct.  Still, because the “comity concerns” analysis that allowed the 
Supreme Court to escape seemingly destructive applications of the antitrust 
laws counsels in favor of courts having the option to consider what law will 
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 303.  Northrop Grumman Ship Sys., Inc. v. Ministry of Def. of the Republic of Venez., 575 F.3d 
491, 498 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Because this case arises under the FSIA, we apply the choice-of-law rules of 
the forum state.”); Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 313 
F.3d 70, 84 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Barkanic v. Gen. Admin. of Civil Aviation of China, 923 F.2d 957, 
959 (2d Cir. 1991)) (“[R]ather than directing courts to apply the choice of law rules of the place of [the 
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F.3d 361, 381 n.8 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that, in an FSIA case, the forum state’s choice of law rules 
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principles).  But see Schoenberg v. Exportadora de Sal, S.A. de C.V., 930 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 1991) 
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 304.  Vargas v. Air Fr. Freighter, No. 02 C 5912, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4524, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 
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ultimately apply and the importance of the sovereign interests behind that 
policy, a court should analyze this factor in determining whether to 
exercise restraint.  Moreover, the conflict of laws analysis of the interest of 
the forum in, and its connection to, the suit will distill this factor for the 
court and make apparent how and whether significant issues of foreign law 
counsel in favor of jurisdictional restraint. 
CONCLUSION 
In essence, the key to creating a more uniform interpretation of 
FSIA’s direct effect provision may be to understand that its reach is 
determined by principles of statutory interpretation and judicial restraint—
e.g., general principles of international law and comity concerns.  This 
balance is the core of the multifaceted extraterritoriality inquiry that the 
Supreme Court has conducted in other areas of the law, and its structure 
may help courts to resolve questions regarding the reach of FSIA’s direct 
effect provisions in a more uniform way, avoiding the circuit split that has 
emerged over the legally significant act test.  In addition, using this inquiry 
for FSIA cases may also create clarity in other areas of the law because it 
will generate useful analogies as to the relationship between federal and 
state law in these cases, whether judicial restraint is truly necessary, and 
whether courts here have been too cautious in their approach to the 
extraterritorial reach of U.S. law and jurisdiction. 
Disparate frameworks of analysis will only create illogical double 
standards and confusing jurisprudential tests that harm litigants and the 
administration of justice.  The time is right to integrate the analysis for 
extraterritoriality under FSIA’s direct effect provision with the analysis 
conducted under other federal statutes. 
 
